

"P-Files"

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France Updated to 4/6/40

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Authority NND 7415074

April 6, 1940

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Changes No. 1

French Combat Estimate

The Combat Estimate, France, is being brought up to date by  
"Changes No. 1", April 6, 1940, as follows:

Replace pages 32, 40 and 64.

Add pages 27-a, 27-b, 27-c, 32-a and 40-a.

Please insert the above pages and destroy those replaced.



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Authority NND 745074

October 1, 1939

(Revised as of above date.  
As changes occur hereafter  
they will be indicated by  
date on page revised.)

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Combat Estimate

I. SYSTEM OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

1. Coordination of National Defense.

a. The Military Forces consist of:

The Army under the Ministry of War  
The Navy under the Ministry of Marine  
The Air Army under the Air Ministry  
The Gendarmerie (National Police Force) under  
The Minister of the Interior in peace time.

b. The Supreme Commander. The Constitution vests supreme command in the President of the Republic but in practice immediate control is exercised by the respective Ministers. Presidential orders to be valid must be countersigned by the Minister concerned. Decrees of January 21, 1938, greatly increased the authority of the Minister of National Defense and War. This position, created June 6, 1936, had been little more than that of senior coordinator of the War, Navy and Air Ministries. The new decrees made the incumbent, Edouard Daladier, Minister of National Defense in fact as well as in name. (Since April 10, 1938, he has been Premier as well.) He was given right of final approval for the three services of (1) measures concerning the preparation and employment of the armed forces, (2) armament, construction and manufacturing programs, (3) credits for construction and new materiel, (4) appointments as Chiefs of Staffs and to members of the Superior Councils. Furthermore he was named chairman of a committee of high government officials charged with the production of war materials.

Although the Ministers of Air and Navy continue to exist, their principal decisions are subject to approval by the Minister of National Defense and War and their functions retain importance chiefly in the political and parliamentary fields. These same decrees also created the position of Chief of the General Staff of National Defense and appointed thereto General Maurice Gamelin who also retained his position as Chief of the General Staff of the Army. General Gamelin's duties include those of adviser to the Minister on all questions referred to him and the coordination of plans for the strategical preparation for war and for the mobilization and war plans of the ground and air forces. When combined naval operations are involved he may be authorized by the Minister to coordinate these.

Existing agencies such as the General Secretariat of National Defense, the Permanent Committee of National Defense (see below) and the Army General Staff, with representatives from the other services, are to be utilized in making the studies and formulating the plans and orders directed by the Minister and Chief of Staff of National Defense.

Although not ideal from the organizational standpoint because of the duality of the functions imposed upon the Minister and the Chief of Staff,

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this recent development is believed of great importance in securing for France a definite unified effort for national defense. While a peacetime measure, it establishes a basis for unity of command in war.

c. The Supreme Council of National Defense.

(1) Composition. All of the Ministers of the Government and in addition the following officials who serve in a consultative capacity only: the Under Secretary of State to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the Inspector General of the Antiaircraft Defense of the Territory, the Vice Presidents of the Superior War, Navy and Air Councils, and the Vice President of the Commission on Studies.

(2) Mission. To furnish the Government a recommendation on each of the important questions relative to National Defense.

(3) Organization. To assist the Supreme Council of National Defense in its mission, there is organized as an adjunct and part of it, two separate bodies, namely, a Commission on Studies and a permanent Secretariat called "The General Secretariat for National Defense."

(a) Commission on Studies. This Commission functions under the supreme direction of the President of the Council of Ministers who appoints a Vice President to be the working head. Its membership includes the chiefs of staff (or deputy chiefs of staff) of the Army, Navy and Air Army, and the representatives of other ministries who have any duties with the preparation of the nation for war.

Mission. It is charged with the preliminary examination of all important questions which are to be presented to the Council of National Defense, and it proposes to the government a solution of the resulting inter-ministerial action to be taken.

The Commission on Studies may summon legally any civil or military persons who may be helpful to them in their work.

(b) The General Secretariat is a permanent working body, under the immediate orders of the Minister of National Defense and of War, who selects from time to time the officers of the Army, Navy, Air, and officials of the government who are to compose it. It is headed by a general officer with the title of Secretary General of National Defense. It acts as a secretariat for the High Military Committee also.

It is virtually the national defense staff of the chief of government.

Commission on Studies and permanent Secretariats for National Defense are organized in North Africa and the Colonies.

d. The High Military Committee. Organized June 7, 1932; reorganized December 12, 1934. It functions under the chairmanship of the president of the Council of Ministers. It is composed of the three ministers of War, Navy, and Air, of Marshal Petain, and the general officers holding the position of Vice President of the Supreme Council and Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Navy and Air, respectively, and of the Inspector General of the Antiaircraft Defense.

This is a specialized committee for national defense and studies all questions pertaining to the general organization of land, sea and air forces,

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their use, the general armament programs and the apportionment of budgetary appropriations for such programs and armament.

e Permanent Committee of National Defense. The decree of June 6, 1936, referred to in paragraph 1 b, above, announced the organization of a Permanent Committee of National Defense under the active chairmanship of the Minister of National Defense and of War. The Committee has practically the same membership as that of the High Committee and is charged with the same duties. It is believed, therefore, that it replaces the High Committee. There functions under this Committee a Central Control Bureau for War Materials which is charged with the coordination and control of the manufacture of and trade in war materials.

f. Coordination of Passive Defense. The Minister of National Defense is charged with directing, controlling and coordinating the preparation of passive defense against air attacks, and will have a general plan drafted to equip the country therefor.

He is assisted in the direction and coordination of passive defense by a Passive Defense Bureau and, in an advisory capacity, by a Superior Passive Defense Committee. In the control of passive defense measures throughout the territory he is assisted by an Inspector General of Passive Defense.

The Passive Defense Bureau is a large bureau headed by a General of the Army and including representatives of the Ministries of War, Navy, Air and Interior. It draws up the general plan for the passive defense of the territory and the plan for the manufacture or requisition of materiel necessary upon mobilization for passive defense. It drafts all legislative texts, regulations, and instructions concerning passive defense and conducts research, technical studies and all experiments thereon. Further it causes the Superior Committee of Passive Defense to be convened and prepares the agenda of its meetings.

The Superior Committee of Passive Defense advises the Minister of National Defense concerning the organization of passive defense. It is composed of representatives of elected bodies, of the Central Administration, of the regional administration and of the Paris Region. It is a large body and has a permanent section.

The Inspector General of Passive Defense, under the immediate orders of the Minister of National Defense, controls the preparation of passive defense measures throughout the territory.

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II. ARMY.

2. Personnel.

a. Active Forces.

Station	Troops	Gendarmerie and Garde Mobile	Garde Republi- caine de Paris	Total
France	466,362	17,637	2,988	516,987
Algeria-Tunisia	99,961	--	--	99,961
Morocco	69,346	--	--	69,346
Near East	13,867	151	--	14,018
Colonies	65,564	--	--	65,564
TOTALS	715,100	47,788	2,988	765,876

b. Reserves. The Organized Reserves (including native troops) available for military service are estimated at 4,500,000 of which 500,000 are native.

c. Total Active and Organized Reserves. 5,262,914.

d. Total Active Officers. 33,321 (includes Gendarmerie, etc., and Colonies).

e. Additional Manpower. Conservatively estimated at 1,000,000 who are beyond legal age but fit for some character of military service.

f. Untrained Reserves. It is estimated that North African possessions and colonies have a population of two and one-half million men fit for military service that might be exploited. Conservatively, however, France could probably train the following:

Algeria-Tunis	450,000
Morocco	225,000
Western and Equatorial Africa	400,000
	<u>1,075,000</u>

The customs guards under the Minister of Finance, the Forest Guards under the Minister of Agriculture, and the regiment of firemen of the City of Paris under the Prefect of the Seine, are in time of war all placed at the disposal of the War Department.

Total mobilizable manpower:

Active .....	765,876
Reserves .....	4,500,000

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Additional Manpower ..... 1,000,000  
Untrained North Africans ... 1,075,000  
7,340,876

NOTE: The number of natives actually employable in a European war is an uncertain quantity because of the current political and economic unrest in North Africa.

3. Organization.

a. Commander in Chief. The Chief of the General Staff of the Army is also designated as The Vice President of the Superior War Council. When war is declared he automatically becomes Commander in Chief of all of the French Armies in the principal theaters of operations designated by the government.

b. War Department.

(1) Organization of the Ministry. There are the following organs of military command and administration at the War Department:

The Superior War Council  
The General Staff of the Army  
The Permanent Inspectorates-General  
The Directorates  
The Central Administration  
The Military Geographical Department  
The High Military Committee of Roads and  
Overland Transportation.

In addition, there are a number of committees and commissions, the principal of which are the Supreme Military Commission for Railways, the Commission for Military Explosives, the Central Gunpowder Commission, the Advisory Committee on Colonial Defense, and the Advisory Mixed Commission for Questions regarding the General Organization of Labor and Industrial Matters in connection with Military Establishments.

(2) The Superior War Council.

(a) Powers and Duties. It is the duty of the Superior War Council to advise on all matters connected with the preparation for war and all measures which may affect the constitution of the Army. It must be consulted concerning the general organization of the Army, methods of instruction and training of troops, fundamental arrangements for mobilization, plans for concentration, the establishment of new communications, the adoption of new war material and the general organization of the fortresses.

(b) Composition.

Members with a vote: The Minister of War, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, the Marshals of France, 12 major generals (maximum). The latter are selected from general officers who have performed the duties for one year of commander of a military region, or command of like rank, or of Inspector General of the infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers or colonial troops, or of Chief of Staff of the Army.

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Members with deliberative voice but without vote: The Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and Air Army, and one other officer from each of the Superior Councils, Navy and Air Army, respectively. However, these members vote where the Council makes recommendations pertaining to the Navy or Air.

(3) The General Staff of the Army. The General Staff is placed under the authority of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, who is likewise the Vice President of the Superior War Council. This officer has two principal assistants in time of peace to relieve him of routine duties. The first is known as the Chief of Staff of the Field Armies. He is his constant collaborator in all matters pertaining to the duties of the Chief of the General Staff, as Commander in Chief of the Armies in the Field upon mobilization.

The second assistant is the Chief of Staff of the Army, who is charged with directing the activities of the General Staff of the Army and the agencies attached thereto. Upon mobilization this officer remains at the War Department and is elevated to the rank of Chief of the General Staff in the interior. He is assisted by three deputy chiefs of staff, who are either major generals or brigadier generals.

(a) The Staff consists of:

The Secretariat of the Chief of Staff,  
Four Bureaus corresponding approximately to our  
G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4,  
Armament and Technical Research Branch,  
Four sections: Overseas, Historical, Administration, and Codes.

(4) Inspectorates General. The Divisional Generals who are members of the Superior War Council are appointed in time of peace by the Minister to inspect troops of all arms, to direct grand maneuvers, military works, and staff tours. The Inspectors-General are responsible to the Inspector-General of the Army only. (This officer is the Vice President of the Superior War Council and the Chief of the General Staff of the Army.) Their offices are known as "Inspectorates-General." They disappear in time of war since the responsibility for tactical efficiency then passes to Army, corps and division commanders.

They inspect for tactical training, fitness of troops, morale, schools, worthiness of officers to command, adequacy of supply, upkeep of premises occupied, skill in maneuvers and like matters.

There are seven permanent Inspectorates-General of Infantry, Cavalry, Tanks, Train Units, Artillery, Engineers, Colonial Troops, respectively. In addition there are Inspectorates-General of Artillery Material, Munitions, Motor Materiel, Artillery Manufactures, War Manufactures on Mobilization, Army Mechanization Service.

There is no counterpart in our Army to this organization, although a few duties performed by the Inspectors are similar to those devolving upon our Chiefs of Arms and Branches. The latter have a closer counterpart in the Directorates of the Arms and Services.

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(5) Directorates of Arms and Services. The Directorates of Arms and Services are subordinate to the General Staff of the Army as regards organization, the training of troops, mobilization, armament, defense of the country and supply. The officers heading the Directorates are known as "Directors", nearly all of whom hold the rank of Brigadier-General. They are concerned only with the interior management of their arm or branch, and its coordination with other branches. These officers correspond most nearly to our Chiefs of Arms and Services.

(6) The Central Administration. A comprehensive organization which includes the Minister's Secretariat, divided into a military branch and a civilian branch; the Under-Secretariat of State; the Secretariat-General; the General Staff of the Army (see above); the Supervisory Department (budget, accountancy, etc.); the Department for litigious affairs, military justice and gendarmerie; the Department for the Service of the personnel and materiel of the Central Administration; the Directorates (see above).

(7) The Military Geographical Department. A service that deals with the preparation and publication of maps, geodetic and cartographic work in France, Algeria, Tunis, Morocco, and Syria, and scientific work connected therewith; the investigation and manufacture of optical and surveying instruments for the army.

(8) The Military Organization.

(a) The military constitution of the nation rests on three essential laws:

- Law on the General Organization of the Army, of July 13, 1927;
- Law on Officers and Men for the Army, of March 28, 1928;
- Law on the Recruiting of the Army of March 31, 1928.

Contrary to the pre-war organization wherein the army passed from a peace footing to war footing by mere reinforcement, the new laws make a distinction between the peacetime army and the wartime army. The former has become only an organ for training and preparation for war and protection of mobilization, whereas the latter is the organ of execution. The real army is the war army. It is formed upon mobilization, in the mobilization centers, at which the regiments are organized. The peacetime army is properly speaking the school which prepares the army for wartime.

In time of peace, the army consists of a territorial organization and permanent forces.

(b) Territorial Organization. The general military organization is based on the division of continental France into 20 military regions. There is also one military region in Algeria. The object of the territorial subdivision is to provide for recruiting, military training, mobilization and the operation of the services required by the army in peace. It is in reality a Corps Area Service Command functioning in time of peace.

(c) The Army. In France, there is but one army known as the land army (armee de terre). It is composed of both metropolitan and colonial troops which, taken together, make up the permanent forces.

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(c) The Army. In France, there is but one army known as the land army (armee de terre). It is composed of both metropolitan and colonial troops which, taken together, make up the permanent forces.

1. Distinction between Metropolitan and Colonial Troops. It is essential to understand the difference between metropolitan troops and colonial troops, and what is meant when the word "colonies" is used. Metropolitan troops are those composed of Frenchmen, foreigners (Foreign Legion) and natives of North Africa only, and are stationed principally in France. Colonial troops are composed of Frenchmen and natives of the Colonies.

There is no longer a colonial army as such but the law has retained colonial troops with a complete autonomy. There is a strict separation between the home units and the colonial units in that a person cannot ordinarily pass from one to the other by promotion or transfer, their administration is absolutely separate and their regulations are different. With those reservations, let it be understood that colonial troops can be used in France as well as in the colonies and we so find them, in the same manner that the metropolitan troops composing the "Mobile Forces" can be used in the colonies as well as in France or in North Africa.

From the standpoint of recruiting, the colonial troops differ from the troops in France only by the incorporation of natives other than those of North Africa. Senegalese, Malagasies and Indo-Chinese can be incorporated only into colonial units, while natives of North Africa and foreigners (Foreign Legion) can be incorporated only into the metropolitan troops in which they form special units. The natives of North Africa, therefore, are restricted to the metropolitan army. When the word "colonies" is used, it refers to all possessions exclusive of North Africa and the Levant. The latter territories are not spoken of as "colonies."

Colonial troops serving in the colonies are organized into seven groups, called respectively, Indo-China, West Africa, Equatorial Africa, West India, Pacific, French Congo, and Somaliland. Units of the colonial troops, when stationed in France, are grouped into separate commands. They are scattered throughout the various areas or regions, and are under the region commander for everything except training, replacement, changes in personnel and administration. These matters are centralized in the hands of a commander of colonial troops in the "metropole." As such this officer has the rank and privileges of a regional (corps area) commander.

2. The Permanent Forces. The metropolitan and colonial troops together are organized into three categories of troops, each with a special mission which determines the character of the organization.

a. Forces in France. A portion of the Metropolitan units sometimes called Home troops. Composed of Frenchmen only. Stationed permanently in France. Their mission is to constitute active nuclei of mobilized units and to insure protection at home.

b. Overseas Forces. A name given to troops composed partly of metropolitan units and partly of colonial units, and of Frenchmen, natives, and foreigners. Stationed permanently in North Africa and in the Levant. Distinct from the troops of the colonies (all possessions except North Africa and the Levant). These forces are made up of certain fixed organizations of Frenchmen, Algerians, Tunisians and Moroccans, and auxiliary organizations of North Africa and the Levant.



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c. Mobile Forces. Partly metropolitan and partly colonial units, composed of Frenchmen and natives, and stationed normally in France. "Mobile Forces" is a special name given to a group of 4 North African Mobile divisions (metropolitan troops), 2 Senegalese Colonial divisions, 1 white Colonial division, and 1 group of Indo-Chinese and Malagasy units approaching a division in strength.

d. Composition of the Army. The active army consists of:

- (1) Troops of all arms - home infantry, colonial infantry, cavalry, artillery, colonial artillery, engineers and train.
- (2) The general officers and the general services of the army.

LARGE UNITS				
	Designation	Location	Composition	Remarks
I	Home Force	France	20 Divisions Infantry (6 reinforced, 6 normal, 6 reduced strength, 2 Alpine)	Composed of Frenchmen only
	Metropolitan Troops		3 Divs. Cavalry	
			2 Light Mechanized Divs. (1 complete, 1 in course of organization).	
			Non-Divisional elements	
II	Mobile Forces (Expeditionary Force)	Normally in France	7 Divisions: 4 Divs. - North African (M)	Composed of Frenchmen and natives
	Part Metropolitan		2 Divs. Mixed, Senegalese and Frenchmen (C)	
	Part Colonial		1 White Colonial Div. (C)	
			1 Group Indo-Chinese and Malagasy units (C)	
III	Overseas Force	Permanent-ly in North Africa	3 Divisions (Algeria) 1 Division (Tunis) 3 Divisions (Morocco) (1 Colonial Division)	The term "overseas force" does not include Colonial troops that are stationed in the colonies.
	Part Metropolitan		2 Brigades (Morocco)	
	Part Colonial		Mixed colonials	The term

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LARGE UNITS (Continued)			
Designation	Location	Composition	Remarks
		Auxiliary organiza- tions of North Africa and Levant.	"colonies" ap- plies to all French posses- sions except North Africa and the Levant. Composed of Frenchmen, na- tives and for- eigners.
IV : Colonial Forces	In the Colonies: Indo-China, West Afri- ca, Equat. Africa, Madagascar, West Indies, etc.	2 Divisions, Infantry; 5 Brigades, Infantry; a number of separate regiments and battal- ions of Infantry and Artillery; Auxiliary troops and Services.	Composed of Frenchmen and natives.

c. Armies, Corps, Divisions.

(1) Army. The Army includes a variable number of infantry and cavalry divisions, corps and army troops and units from GHQ reserve. It is an autonomous unit complete in itself, comprising all means for combat and supply. It is not organized in time of peace.

The Group of Armies is formed when common direction of two or more armies is desirable.

(2) Army Corps. The law makes no provision for the organization of an army corps in time of peace. In war, it will comprise two or more divisions and corps troops. At mobilization each military region mobilizes a corps of 2 Divisions. The region commander is also the corps commander. He has two general staffs, one for the region and one for the corps. At the declaration of war the chief of staff of the region becomes the corps area commander thus permitting the corps to mobilize and move without interfering with the mobilization in the area.

(a) War Strength of Corps (normal type).\*

	Officers	Men
Hq. and staff	72	370
Corps troops	272	9,099
Total	344	9,469
2 Divisions	1,020	34,600
Total	1,364	44,069

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LARGE UNITS (Continued)			
Designation	Location	Composition	Remarks
			applies to all:
			French posses-
			sions except
			North Africa
			and the Levant:
			Composed of
			Frenchmen, na-
			tives and for-
			eigners.
IV : Colonial Forces:	In the	2 Divisions, Infantry;	Composed of
	Colonies:	5 Brigades, Infantry;	Frenchmen and
	Indo-	a number of separate	natives.
	China,	regiments and battalions	
	West Af-	of Infantry and Artil-	
	rica, Eq.	lery; Auxiliary troops	
	Africa,	and Services.	
	Madagas-		
	car, West		
	Indies,		
	etc.		

c. Armies, Corps, Divisions.

(1) Army. The Army includes a variable number of infantry and cavalry divisions, corps and army troops and units from GHQ reserve. It is an autonomous unit complete in itself, comprising all means for combat and supply. It is not organized in time of peace.

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(a) War Strength of Corps (Normal Type) (round numbers).

Units	Officers	Men
Hqrs. and Staff	86	350
Corps troops	303	9,815
Total	390	10,200
2 Divisions	1,000	32,300
Total	1,390	42,500

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War Strength of Corps (Motorized Type) (round numbers).

Units	Officers	Men
Hqrs. and Staff	84	320
Corps troops	275	8,120
Total	360	8,450
2 Divisions (motorized type)	1,100	31,200
Total	1,460	39,650

(b) Composition of Army Corps Troops (Normal Type).

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Vehicles	Liaison Vehicles (Motor)	Trucks and Lt. Trucks	Motor Vehicles (Cross-country)	Motorcycles
I. HEADQUARTERS								
Staff	25	50	5	-	-	-	-	-
Commanders of Arms and Services	58	80	5	-	4	5	-	3
Hqrs. Troops and Services	3	200	10	2	31	20	-	22
Total	86	330	20	2	35	25	-	25
II. TROOPS								
1. Infantry (Pioneers):								
1 Regt. of 3 Bns.	50	2600	130	60	1	15	-	10
2. Reconnaissance Detachment:								
Staff and Command Platoon								
Service Troop								
1 Sq. (Horse) of 2 Troops	36	900	500	5	15	65	-	110
1 Sq. consisting of: 1 Motorcycle Troop								
1 M.G. & A.T. Cannon Troop								
3. Artillery:								
Corps Art. Staff	8	-	7	-	-	-	-	-
1 Corps Artillery Regt. consisting								

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Composition of Army Corps Troops, Normal Type (Continued)

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Vehicles	Liaison Vehicles (Motor)	Trucks and Lt. Trucks	Motor Vehicles (Cross- country)	Motorcycles
of: 2 Bns. of 105 mm. } 2 Bns. of } 155 mm. L 17 }	90	3170	2750	380	30	50	-	10
Total	98	3170	2757	380	30	50	-	10
4. Engineers:								
1 Sn. Staff	2	8	2	-	1	1	-	2
2 Cos. Sapper Mineurs	10	550	80	35	2	9	-	-
Total	12	560	80	35	3	10	-	2
5. Communications:								
1 Corps Tele- graph Co.	3	210	15	2	2	20 (Plus 8 Trailers)	2	19
1 Radio Co.	4	190	-	-	3	33 (Plus 4 Trailers)	-	10
1 Carrier-Pigeon Det.	-	50	10	8	1	7 (Plus 6 Trailers)	-	1
Total	7	450	25	10	6	60	2	30
6. Aviation:								
1 Aerial Obsn. ) Gp. consisting ) of: General ) Services, 1 ) Section of ) Autogyros (1), ) 1 Obsn. Sqad., ) 1 Bomb. Sect. ) (1) )	9	113	-	-	3	11	-	2
						(3 Autogyros, 9 Planes, 2 Planes multi-place; plus 8 Trailers)		
7. Train:								
1 Motor Truck Co.	9	300	-	-	15	80	-	100
1 Horse-drawn Truck Co.	3	150	170	50	-	-	-	-
Total	12	450	170	50	15	80	-	100

III. SERVICES

1. Artillery:  
Corps Artillery  
Park.-

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Composition of Army Corps Troops, Normal Type (Continued)

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Vehicles	Liaison Vehicles (Motor)	Trucks and Lt. Trucks	Motor Vehicles (Cross- country)	Motorcycles
Staff )								
1 Labor Co. )	15	400	-	-	10	75	-	10
2 Motor Ammunition Sections )								
2. Engineers:								
1 Corps Engr. Park Co.	5	200	-	-	2	50 <sup>(2)</sup>	20	5
1 Bridge Train Co. 1901-1935	3	130	-	-	1	40 <sup>(3)</sup>	-	-
Total	8	330	-	-	3	90	20	5
3. Aviation:								
1 Balloon Park Section	1	45	-	-	1	9 <sup>(4)</sup>	-	1
4. Quartermaster:								
Exploitation Gp.) & Co-operative Reserve )	2	80	4	2	1	-	-	-
Meat Supply, Q.M. Personnel	2	10	-	-	-	-	-	-
1 Meat Sup. Co.	8	150	-	-	4 <sup>(5)</sup>	-	-	-
1 Meat Transport Section	1	60	-	-	1	50 <sup>(6)</sup>	-	-
Total	13	300	4	2	6	50	-	-
5. Medical:								
1 Sanitary Supply Group, Horse-drawn )	7	190	70	30	-	1	-	-
1 Light Surgical Ambulance Detachment )	13	60	-	-	-	11	-	-
1 Horse-drawn Medical Ambulance Det. )	9	75	40	20	-	2	-	-
1 Hygiene, Washing and Disinfecting Section )	3	50	-	-	1	4	-	-

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Composition of Army Corps Troops, Normal Type (Concluded)

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Vehicles	Liaison Vehicles (Motor)	Trucks and Lt. Trucks	Motor Vehicles (Cross- country)	Motorcycles
1 Motor Sanitary Section	1	50	-	-	1	21	-	-
Total	33	425	110	50	2	39	-	-
6. Remount: Mobile Remount Group	3	75	130	6	-	-	-	-
IV. SUMMARY:								
Headquarters	86	350	20	2	35	25	-	25
Troops	230	8240	3660	540	75	290	2	260
Services	73	1575	240	60	20	265	20	15
Total (in round numbers)	390	10200	3900	600	130	580	20	300

- Notes: (1) Eventually.  
(2) Plus 27 trailers.  
(3) Plus 32 trailers, drays.  
(4) 200 bottles of Hydrogen and 2 balloon envelopes.  
(5) Liaison touring cars, 2 seated for 4 veterinarians.  
(6) Plus 1 trailer

(c) Composition of Army Corps Troops (Motorized Type).

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Vehicles	Liaison Vehicles (Motor)	Trucks and Lt. Trucks	Motor Vehicles (cross- country)	Motorcycles
I. HEADQUARTERS								
Staff	25	40	-	-	-	-	-	-
Commanders of Arms and Services	56	80	-	-	5	5	-	5
Hqrs. Troops and Services	3	200	-	-	35	30	-	20
Total	84	320	-	-	40	35	-	25

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Composition of Army Corps Troops, Motorized Type (Continued)

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Vehicles	Liaison Vehicles (Motor)	Trucks and Lt. Trucks	Motor Vehicles (Cross- country)	Motorcycles
<b>II. TROOPS</b>								
1. Infantry:								
1 Pioneer Regt. of 3 Bns.	50	2600	130	60	1	15	-	10
2. Reconnaissance Det.								
Staff, Command Plat., and Service Troop								
1 Motorcycle Squadron of 2 Troops								
1 Squadron consisting of: 1 Motorcycle Troop, 1 Motorcycle M.G. and Anti-Tank Gun Troop	33	785	-	-	30	70	-	275
3. Artillery:								
Corps Art. Staff	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1 Corps Art. Regt. consisting of: 2 Bns. of 105 L cross-country type; 1 Bn. of 155 G.P.F.	70	1775	-	-	60	200	80	30
Total	78	1775	-	-	60	200	80	30
4. Engineers:								
1 Bn. Staff	2	10	-	-	1	1	-	4
2 Cos. of Sapper Mineurs	10	550	-	-	4	24	-	16
Total	12	560	-	-	5	25	-	20
5. Communications:								
1 Corps Telegr. Co.	3	200	-	-	2	25	2	19 (Plus 8 trailers)
1 Corps Radio Co.	4	180	-	-	3	30	-	10 (Plus 4 trailers)
1 Carrier-Pigeon Det.	-	50	-	-	1	15	-	1 (Plus 13 trailers)
Total	7	430	-	-	6	70	2	30

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Composition of Army Corps Troops, Motorized Type (Continued)

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Vehicles	Liaison Vehicles (Motor)	Trucks and Lt. Trucks	Motor Vehicles (Cross- country)	Motorcycles
6. Aviation:								
1 Aerial Obsn. Gp. consisting of:								
General Services)								
1 Section of ) Autogyros (1)								
1 Obsn. Squadron)	9	113	-	-	3	11	-	2
1 Bomb. Section ) (1)								
					(3 Autogyros, 9 Planes, 2 Planes multi-place; plus 8 trailers)			
7. Train:								
1 Hq. Motor Truck Co.	5	170	-	-	10	15	-	100
1 Motor Transport Co. of 3 Sections	5	175	-	-	10	65	-	10
Total	10	345	-	-	20	80	-	110
III. SERVICES								
1. Artillery:								
Corps Artillery ) Park Staff )								
1 Labor Company )	15	400	-	-	10	75	-	10
2 Motor Ammunition ) Sections )								
2. Engineers:								
1 Corps Engr. Park Co.	5	200	-	-	2	50	20	5
						(Plus 27 trailers)		
1 Bridge Train Co. 1901-1935	3	130	-	-	1	40	-	-
						(Plus 32 trailers, drays)		
Total	8	330	-	-	3	90	20	5
3. Aviation:								
1 Balloon Park Section	1	15	-	-	1	9	-	1
						(Plus 3 trailers)		
4. Quartermaster:								
Exploitation Group) and Co-operative ) Reserve )	2	80	-	-	1	5	-	-
Heat Supply, Q.M. Personnel	2	10	-	-	-	-	-	-

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Composition of Army Corps Troops, Motorized Type (Concluded)

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Vehicles	Liaison Vehicles (Motor)	Trucks and Lt. Trucks	Motor Vehicles (Cross- country)	Motorcycles
1 Meat Supply Co.	8	150	-	-	4(2)	-	-	-
1 Meat Transport Section	1	60	-	-	1	50(3)	-	-
Total	13	300	-	-	6	55	-	-
5. Medical:								
1 Motor Type Sani- tary Supply Group	7	185	-	-	-	27	-	-
1 Light Surgical Ambulance Det.	13	70	-	-	-	14	-	-
1 Motor Hygiene, ) Washing and Dis- ) infecting Sect. )	3	50	-	-	1	8	-	-
1 Motor Medical Ambulance Det.	9	70	-	-	-	13	-	-
1 Motor Sanitary Section	1	50	-	-	1	21	-	-
Total	33	425	-	-	2	80	-	-
IV. SUMMARY								
Headquarters	84	320	-	-	40	35	-	25
Troops	205	6630	130	60	125	470	80	475
Services	70	1490	-	-	20	310	20	15
Total (in round numbers)	360	8450	130	60	185	815	100	515

Notes: (1) Eventually.  
(2) Liaison touring cars, 2 seated for 4 veterinarians.  
(3) Plus 1 trailer.

(3) Cavalry Corps. This unit does not exist in time of peace nor is there any cadre provided for its formation in war. A cavalry corps consisting of 2 cavalry divisions and 1 light mechanized division has been used in problems at the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre.

(4) The Division. The largest unit provided by law for the peacetime army is the division. Its strength in peace varies depending upon the strength of the annual contingent and the immediate mission on mobilization. There are two types (Normal and Motorized).

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(a) 1. The Infantry Division (Normal Type) Composition and War Strength.

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Vehicles	Liaison Vehicles (Motor)	Trucks and At. Trucks	Motor Vehicles (Cross- country)	Motorcycles
<u>HEADQUARTERS:</u>								
Staff	14	25	10	-	-	-	-	-
C. O.'s of Arms	15	25	-	-	-	-	-	-
Services *	13	25	-	-	-	-	-	-
H.Q. Troops	3	150	10	5	15	15	-	20
Total	45	225	20	5	15	15	-	20
<u>TROOPS:</u>								
1. <u>Infantry.-</u>								
3 Regts. of 3 Bns. each	240	9000	870	570	20	140	27 <sup>(1)</sup>	120
1 Divisional A.T. Company	4	150	20	20	-	3	3 <sup>(1)</sup>	2
1 Pioneer Company	3	225	10	5	-	2	-	3
Total	247	9375	900	595	20	145	30	125
2. <u>Reconnaissance</u>								
<u>Detachment.-</u>								
Staff & Com. Plat.)	30	660	280	5	10	55	-	100
Service Troop )								
1 Troop (Horse) )								
1 Troop (Motor- cycle) )								
1 M.G. and Anti- Tank Gun Troop )								
3. <u>Artillery.-</u>								
1 Regt. 75mm. of 3 Bns.	70	2090	1790	270	20	35	-	5
1 Regt. 155 C of 2 Bns.	50	1660	1320	190	13	30	-	5
1 Divisional Anti- Tank Battery	4	190	175	25	2	-	-	5
Total	124	3940	3285	485	35	65	-	15
4. <u>Engineers.-</u>								
1 Battalion Staff	2	10	2	-	1	1	-	2
2 Cos. of Sapper Mineurs	10	550	80	35	2	8	-	-
Total	12	560	82	35	3	9	-	2

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19The Infantry Division (Normal Type) Composition and War Strength (Continued)

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Vehicles	Liaison Vehicles (Motor)	Trucks and Lt. Trucks	Motor Vehicles (Cross- country)	Motorcycles
5. <u>Communications.-</u>								
1 Telegraph Co.	4	230	10	5	2	20 (Plus 9 Trailers)	4	20
1 Radio Company	3	170	-	-	2	25 (Plus 3 Trailers)	2	10
Total	7	400	10	5	4	45	6	30
6. <u>Train.-</u>								
1 Truck Co. (2)	2	30	-	-	5	15	-	2
1 Horse-drawn Company (3)	4	200	220	80	-	-	-	-
Total	6	230	220	80	5	15	-	2
SERVICES:								
1. <u>Artillery.-</u>								
Divisional Artillery Park (4)	12	400	130	30	10	45	-	5
2. <u>Quartermaster.-</u>								
Exploitation Group	2	50	4	2	1	-	-	-
3. <u>Medical.-</u>								
1 Divisional Sanitary Group, (5) ) horse-drawn type )	14	220	80	40	1	1	-	1
1 Motor Sanitary Section, light type )	1	50	-	-	2	20	-	1
Total	15	270	80	40	3	21	-	2
SUMMARY:								
Headquarters	45	225	20	5	15	15	-	20
Troops	425	15200	4770	1200	75	325	36(6)	270
Services	30	725	210	70	15	65	-	10
Total (in round numbers)	500	16150	5000	1275	105	405	36(6)	300(7)

Notes: \* Services include Military Justice, Gendarmerie, Finance and Mail.  
 (1) Chenillettes.  
 (2) Not including the H.Q. Detachment and the Motor Sanitary Service.

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Notes (Continued)

- (3) Not including the H.Q. Detachment and that of the Medical Service but including 2 Transport Sections of 36 and 30 useable vehicles.
- (4) Comprises: 1 Labor Company  
1 Ammunition Section, horse-drawn  
1 Motor Ammunition Section.
- (5) Comprises: 1 Litter Bearer Element (90 men in 3 Platoons)  
1 Element of the Divisional Hospital (72 hospital nurses and attendants).
- (6) 30 of which are Chenillettes.
- (7) Plus 430 bicycles.

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Collective Armament, Infantry Division (Normal Type).

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<u>Rifles</u>	<u>LMG</u>	<u>MG</u>	<u>Trench Mortars</u>	<u>Anti-Tank Weapons</u>	<u>Artillery Weapons</u>
4185 <sup>(1)</sup>	366 <sup>(2)</sup> (7.5mm.) ( 8 mm.)	189 <sup>(3)</sup> (7.5mm.) ( 8 mm.)	29-60mm. <sup>(4)</sup> (a) 24-81mm. (b)	52-25mm. <sup>(5)</sup> (a) 6-75mm. (b)	36-75mm. <sup>(6)</sup> (a) 24-155mm. (b)

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- (1) 155 rifles per Inf. Co.
- (2) 12 to each Inf. Rifle Co.  
4 to each Inf. Regt. Hqrs.  
24 to Div. Rec. Det.  
2 to Pioneer Co.  
4 to Div. Anti-Tank Co.
- (3) 16 to each Inf. Bn. Accompanying Weapons Co. (4 specialized in antiaircraft fire)  
13 to Division Anti-Tank Gun Bat.  
10 to Division Rec. Det.  
13 to 75mm. Artillery Regt.  
9 to 155mm. Artillery Regt.
- (4) (a) 1 to each Inf. Rifle Co.  
2 to Div. Rec. Det.  
(b) 2 to each Inf. Regt. Weapons Co.  
2 to each Inf. Bn. Accompanying Weapons Co.
- (5) (a) 6 to each Inf. Regt. Weapons Co.  
2 to each Inf. Bn. Accompanying Weapons Co.  
12 to the Div. Anti-Tank Gun Co.  
4 to the Div. Rec. Det.  
(b) 6 to the Div. Anti-Tank Gun Battery.
- (6) (a) 1 Regt. of 3 Bns. of 3 Batteries (4 guns each)
- (b) 1 Regt. of 2 Bns. of 3 Batteries (4 guns each).

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2. The Infantry Division (Motorized Type) Composition and War Strength.

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Carts	Liaison Vehicles (Motor)	Trucks and Lt. Trucks	Motor Vehicles (Cross- country)	Motorcycles
I. HEADQUARTERS:								
Staff	16	25	-	-	-	-	-	-
Commanders of Arms	15	25	-	-	-	-	-	-
Services	12	25	-	-	-	-	-	-
H.Q. Troops	3	150	-	-	25	25	-	30
Total	46	225	-	-	25	25	-	30

II. TROOPS:

1. Infantry.-

3 Regts. motorized) type each of	270	9000	210	210	40	330	54 <sup>(1)</sup>	360
3 Bns. )								
1 Divisional Anti- Tank Co., motor- ized type )	4	150	-	-	1	5	12 <sup>(1)</sup>	10
1 Pioneer Co.	3	225	-	-	1	5	-	-
Total	277	9375	210	210	42	340	66	370

2. Reconnaissance Det.-

Staff & Com. Plat.)								
1 Service Troop )								
1 Squadron con- sisting of: )								
1 Motorcycle Tr.)								
1 Distant Rec.)								
Armored Car Tr.)	42	940	-	-	35	80	45 <sup>(2)</sup>	250
1 Squadron con- sisting of: )								
1 Motorcycle Tr.)								
1 Close-in Rec.)								
Armored Car Tr.)								
1 Motorcycle M.G.)								
2 A.T. Gun Tr.)								

3. Artillery.-

1 Regt. of 3 Bns. )								
75mm. guns, cross-country tractor type )	70	1665	-	-	60	150	125	70

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Inf. Div. (Motorized Type) Composition and War Strength (Continued)

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Carts	Liaison Vehicles (Motor)	Trucks and Lt. Trucks	Motor Vehicles (Cross- country)	Motorcycles
1 Regt. of 2 Bns. ) 155mm. Hows., cross-country tractor type )	50	1270	-	-	40	120	75	50
1 Divisional Anti- Tank Battery	4	140	-	-	4	10	15	5
Total	124	3075	-	-	104	280	215	125
4. Engineers.-								
1 Battalion Staff	2	10	-	-	1	1	-	4
2 Cos. of Sapper- Mineurs	10	550	-	-	4	24	-	16
Total	12	560	-	-	5	25	-	20
5. Communications.-								
1 Telegraph Co.	4	225	-	-	2	25 (Plus 9 trailers)	4	20
1 Radio Co.	3	175	-	-	2	25 (Plus 3 trailers)	2	10
Total	7	400	-	-	4	50	6	30
6. Train.- (3)								
1 Hqrs. Motor Co.	5	150	-	-	10	10	-	100
1 Motor Trans. Co.	5	150	-	-	10	70	-	10
Total	10	300	-	-	20	80	-	110
III. SERVICES:								
1. Artillery.-								
Div. Artillery Park	13	400	-	-	10	70	-	10
2. Q. M.-								
1 Exploitation Gp.	2	50	-	-	1	5	-	-
3. Medical.-								
1 Divisional Sani- tary Group, motor type )	14	200	-	-	1	40	-	-
1 Motor Sanitary Section	1	50	-	-	1	20	-	-
Total	15	250	-	-	2	60	-	-

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23Inf. Div. (Motorized Type) Composition and War Strength (Concluded)

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Carts	Liaison Vehicles (Motor)	Trucks and Lt. Trucks	Motor Vehicles (Cross- country)	Motorcycles
IV. SUMMARY:								
Headquarters	46	225	-	-	25	25	-	30
Troops	475	14675	210	210	210	842	330	900
Services	30	700	-	-	15	133	-	10
General Total (Round Numbers)	550	15600	210	210	250	1000	330	940

Notes: (1) Chenillettes.

- (2) Of which: (14 Distant Rec. Armored Cars  
(22 Close-in " " "  
(4 - 25mm. A. T. Cannon on Armored Vehicles  
(5 Command Cars

- (3) Comprises: 1 Road Circulation Det. of 3 Plats., each of  
1 Officer, 40 Men, 5 Motor Vehicles and 30 Motorcycles.

(5) Cavalry Division, Composition and Strength.a. Normal Type (Peace).

Headquarters  
2 Brigades of 2 Regiments each (horse)  
1 Battalion of Dragons Portes (motorized cavalrymen)  
1 Squadron of armored cars  
1 Regiment 75mm. artillery of 2 Dns. (horse)  
1 Battalion 105mm. artillery porte  
1 Company engineers (on bicycles)  
1 Telegraph Company  
1 Radio detachment and 1 Pigeon detachment  
Services:- Engineers, Q.M., Medical, Veterinary.  
Total strength:- approximately 6,000.

b. Cavalry Division (Normal Type) Composition and War Strength.

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Vehicles	Road Motor Vehicles	Cross- country	Motorcycles
I. HEADQUARTERS:							
Staff	14	35	9	-	-	-	-

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Cav. Div. (Normal Type) Composition and War Strength (Continued)

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Vehicles	Motor Vehicles		Motorcycles
					Road	Cross- country	
Commanders of Troops) and Directors of ) Services )	46	69	-	-	6	-	1
Troops and Special Services	3	153	19	3	45	-	25
Total	63	257	28	3	51	-	26
					(Plus 2 Chaplains)		

II. TROOPS:

1. Cavalry.-

Cav. Brigade Staff	4	63	20	-	8	-	8
1 Regt. of Cavalry	40	1100	1000	12	52	-	25
1 Regt. of Cavalry	40	1100	1000	12	52	-	25
Total for Brigade (Round Numbers)	85	2260	2000	25	110	-	60
1 Similar Brigade	85	2260	2000	25	110	-	60
Motorized Units.-							
1 Armored Car Regt.	46	1000	-	-	115	70	270
1 Bn. of Dragons Portes	32	1000	-	-	85	100	130
1 Divisional Anti-Tank Gun Troop	4	160	-	-	17	40	20
1 Repair Troop	3	150	-	-	35	15	25
Total for Motorized Units	85	2300	-	-	250	225	450
Total for Cav. Elements	255	6800	4,000	50	470	225	570

2. Artillery.-

1 Mixed Regt. Cross- country tractor ) type, of: )	68	1665	-	-	210	125	70
2 Bns., 75 mm. )							
1 Bn., 105 mm. (H)							

3. Engineers.-

1 Bn. of Engrs. (2 Cos.)	10	390	-	-	32	25	120
1 Bridge Train, Model 1935	3	130	-	-	42	-	-
Total	13	520	-	-	75	25	120

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Cav. Div. (Normal Type) Composition and War Strength (Continued)

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Horses	Horse-drawn Vehicles	Motor Vehicles		Motorcycles
					Road	Cross- country	
<u>4. Communications.-</u>							
1 Telegraph Company	4	224	-	-	26	8	20
1 Radio "	4	228	-	-	32	16	9
1 Carrier-Pigeon Det.	-	19	-	-	4	-	5
Total	8	470	-	-	62	25	35
<u>5. Aviation.-</u>							
The Cavalry Division does not possess organically any aviation elements; these are assigned it according to its needs at a given time.							
<u>6. Train.-</u>							
Horse-drawn Truck Co. (1)	2	45	35	9	-	-	-
Motor Truck Co. (2)	9	350	-	-	100	-	120
Total	11	395	35	9	100	-	120
<u>III. SERVICES:</u>							
<u>1. Quartermaster.-</u>							
Exploitation Group	2	50	-	-	6	-	-
<u>2. Medical.-</u>							
Divisional Sanitary Gp.	11	140	-	-	30	-	1
Motor Sanitary Section	1	49	-	-	22	-	1
Total	12	190	-	-	52	-	2
<u>IV. SUMMARY:</u>							
Headquarters	63	260	30	3	50	-	25
Troops	355	9850	4035	50	917	400	915
Services	14	240	-	-	58	-	2
Total Cavalry Div. (Round Numbers)	430	10500	4100	70	1060	400(3)	950

Notes: (1) Not including the Hq. Detachment.  
(2) Not including Hq., Q.M. and Medical Detachments.  
(3) Seventy-five are combat vehicles (Distant and Close-in Rec., and Combat Armored Cars).

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(6) Light Mechanized Division. Two of the five authorized Cavalry divisions have been converted into Light Mechanized Divisions and a third is now being converted. The composition of the Light Mechanized Division is given herewith:

Light Mechanized Division - Composition and War Strength.

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Road Vehicles	Cross-country Vehicles	Combat Vehicles	Motorcycles
<u>I. HEADQUARTERS:</u>						
Staff	15	26	-	-	-	-
Commanders of Arms and Directors of Services	31	68	6	--	-	1
Troops and Special Services	3	140	48	-	-	25
Total	49(1)	234	54	-	-	26
<u>II. TROOPS:</u>						
<u>1. Cavalry.-</u>						
1 Distant Rec. Armored Car Regt.	36	900	110	1	45	225
Staff of the Light Mechanized Brigade (Combat)	7	50	13	-	-	5
1 Combat Regiment	37	800	95	1	87	160
1 Similar Regiment	37	800	95	1	87	160
Total of the Light Mechanized Brigade (Combat)	81	1650	203	2	174	325
Staff of the Light Mechanized Brigade (Dragons Portes)	7	55	13	-	-	5
Regiment of Dragons Portes	93	2900	200	245	60	445
Total of the Light Mechanized Brigade (Dragons Portes)	100	2955	215	245	60	450
Divisional Anti-Tank Gun Troop	4	160	17	40	-	20
Repair Troop	5	280	60	16	24	30
Total for Cavalry Units	226	5900	600	300	300	1050
<u>2. Artillery.-</u>						
1 Mixed Regt., Cross-country Tractor Type of:	69	1680	215	121	-	56
2 Bns. 75 mm. and						
1 Bn. 105 mm. L 36						

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Light Mechanized Division - Composition and War Strength (Concluded)

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Road Vehicles	Cross-country Vehicles	Combat Vehicles	Motorcycles
<u>3. Engineers.-</u>						
1 Bn. of Engineers of 3 Cos.	14	580	47	36	-	180
1 Bridge Train, Model 35	3	130	42	-	-	-
Total	17	710	89	36	-	180
<u>4. Communications.-</u>						
1 Telegraph Co.	4	224	26	8	-	20
1 Radio Co.	4	247	33	18	-	9
1 Carrier Pigeon Det.	-	19	4	-	-	5
Total	8	490	63	26	-	34
<u>5. Aviation.-</u>						
The Light Mechanized Division does not possess organically any aviation elements; these are assigned it according to its needs at a given time.						
<u>6. Train.-</u>						
L.M.D. Hq. Motor Truck Co. (2)	7	240	48	-	-	121
Motor Transport Co. (3)	5	158	57	-	-	6
Total	12	398	105	-	-	127
<u>III. SERVICES:</u>						
<u>1. Quartermaster.-</u>						
Exploitation Group	2	50	6	-	-	-
<u>2. Medical.-</u>						
Divisional Sanitary Group	11	140	30	-	-	1
Motor Sanitary Section	1	49	22	-	-	1
Total	14	239	58	-	-	2
<u>IV. SUPPLEMENTARY:</u>						
Headquarters	49	234	54	-	-	26
Troops	332	9178	1072	483	300	1447
Services	14	239	58	-	-	2
Total L.M.D. (Round numbers)	400	10000	1200	500	300	1500

Notes: (1) Plus 2 Chaplains.

(2) Not including Hq. Q.M. and Medical Detachments.

(3) Not including the Motor Sanitary Section.

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(6-a) Armored Division. In January 1940, the French organized two Armored Divisions, and there is a strong possibility of a third by spring, and a possible fourth by the advent of summer.

The organization of this Large Unit as it exists at the present time is given below; it may, however, be subject to certain modifications as a result of tests and battle experience.

Element	Composition	Remarks
Command and Staff	4 Sections	Major General Commanding. One officer in Third Section specialized in troop movements.
Demi-Brigade -- B-bis Tanks (33.3 Tons)	See below.	)
Demi-Brigade -- H-39 Tanks (13 Tons)	See below.	) These three units are commanded by a Brigadier General, who approxi- mates the Divisional Infantry Commander in the Infantry Division.
Demi-Brigade -- Chasseurs (Portes):	See below.	)
One Demi-Brigade B-bis Tanks	2 Battalions B-bis Tanks each of: Command and Staff Section 3 Combat Companies (10 tanks per Co.) 1 Service Company Strength per battalion: 50 Officers 610 Men 35 Tanks	Colonel commanding. This unit is the shock element of the division. 30 tanks for the 3 Co.'s of the battalion 1 tank for the battalion C. O. 1 tank for the second in command. 3 tanks for replacement. Total: 70 Tanks per Demi-Brigade.
One Demi-Brigade H-39 Tanks (13 Tons)	2 Battalions H-39 Tanks, each of: Command and Staff Section 3 Combat Companies (13 tanks per Co.) 1 Service Company Strength per battalion: 30 Officers	Colonel commanding. This unit habitually acts with the Demi-Brigade of Chasseurs-Portes. 39 tanks for the 3 Co.'s of the battalion 1 tank for the battalion C. O.

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Element	Composition	Remarks
Engineers	1 Company	Primarily used on roads. May be expanded due to importance of rapid crossing of obstacles, and use of antitank mines.
Communications	1 Radio Company	One Wire Company may be added.
Trains and Services	--	--

Total Strength and Fire Power, Armored Division (Not counting rifles  
and automatic rifles):

Strength . . . . . 9,000 men,  
 Tanks . . . . . 70 B-bis,  
                                     90 H-39  
 Fire Power . . . . . 24 - 105mm. howitzers  
                                     70 - 75mm. guns in B-bis tanks  
                                     70 - 47mm. guns in B-bis tanks  
                                     90 - 37mm. guns in H-39 tanks  
                                     24 - Hotchkiss M. G.'s  
                                     230 - Reibel 7.5 M.G.'s in B-bis  
   and H-39 tanks  
                                     12 - 47mm. antitank guns  
                                     24 - 25mm. antitank guns  
                                     8 - 81mm. mortars

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(It is contemplated that one or more battalions of tanks may be attached as required by circumstances.)

(7) Foreign Legion. Foreigners who are admitted to serve under the French flag can be incorporated in general only in the overseas forces, but these forces may form a part of either the Metropolitan or the Colonial troops. Certain Frenchmen are detailed for duty with the Foreign Legion. The Legion is not a tactical unit but, prior to the start of the present War on September 3, 1939, included 5 regiments of Infantry and 1 regiment of Cavalry, totaling 18,000 men approximately.

Foreign Legion Infantry regiments have no skeletonized units, and are composed normally of a Headquarters, Service Company, Regimental Command and Weapons Company, Pioneer Company, and 3 Battalions; with a total peace strength of 75 officers and 2,565 men. The Foreign Legion Cavalry regiment includes one armored car troop.

Under certain conditions, foreigners may be authorized to enlist for the duration of the war with a view to serving in special units of foreign combatants which will constitute an organic part of the French Army (including the Air and the Navy). Such enlistments may be signed either in time of peace or in time of war. In time of war, certain foreigners may, in exceptional cases, be enlisted in French or native units of the French Army.

d. Combatant Branches.

(1) Infantry. Prior to September 3, 1939 (Declaration of War on Germany), there were 34 regiments of Infantry, 21 battalions of Chasseurs (elite infantry), 7 fortress battalions (Alpins), 6 regiments of Zouaves (Native), 29 regiments of native riflemen, 5 regiments of the Foreign Legion, and some miscellaneous units.

The Regiment, Normal (Peace) Type: - Organization.-

- Regimental Headquarters (Administered by Service Company) Staff
- Regimental Command and Weapons Company consisting of:
  - Staff
  - Regimental Command Section
  - Band
  - Sapper and Pioneer Squad
  - Communications Platoon (includes 1 Motorcycle Scout Squad)
  - 25mm. Anti-tank Cannon Squad (2 cannon).
- Service Company:
  - Headquarters
  - Administrative Section
  - Supply Section
  - Medical Section.
- 3 Battalions, each composed of:
  - Staff, and Command Platoon
  - 1 Accompanying Weapons Company consisting of:
    - 1 Command Platoon
    - 3 M.G. Platoons of 2 squads each (on carts)

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1 Weapons Platoon of:  
    1 - 25mm. Anti-tank cannon  
    1 - 81mm. Mortar squad (2 mortars on carts)  
2 Rifle Companies, each of:  
    1 Command Platoon  
    3 Platoons each of 3 combat groups (squads)  
    1 - 60mm. Mortar squad (1 mortar on cart).  
Total strength: 53 officers, 1,540 men, 86 animals and  
                  24 bicycles.

(2) Other types of French infantry organizations are as follows  
(Their organization is modified to meet the purposes for which they are intended; however that of the infantry regiments and battalions varies but little from the normal type):

Infantry regiment, reinforced type  
Infantry regiment, Alpine, with and without native drivers  
Infantry regiment, Zouaves, normal and motorized types,  
Infantry regiment (motorized normal type and motorized reinforced type)  
Infantry regiment, North African Tirailleurs, 4 types  
Foreign Legion regiments  
Demi-Brigades of Chasseurs a Pied  
Battalions of Chasseurs Alpins, with and without native drivers  
Battalions of light infantry  
Battalions of Chasseurs, porte type (transported in trucks)  
Divisional Anti-tank Companies, normal and motorized types  
Machine Gun battalions, normal and motorized types.

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(3) (a) War Strength Infantry Regiment (Normal Type) 1939.

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Animals	Vehicles (H-d.)	Liaison	Motor Vehicles				Motorcycles	Bicycles	L.M.G.	Collective Armament				
						Light Trucks	Trucks	Chenillettes	Trailers				25mm. Anti- Tank Gun	60mm. Mortar	81mm. Mortar		
<u>REGIMENTAL:</u>																	
Staff, and Command Company	12	205	20	5	2	4	-	(1)-	-	35	30	4	-	-	-	-	-
Service Company	6	170	60	27	1	16	5	6	-	5	8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Regt. Weapons Company (2)	3	105	17	14	-	1	-	3	-	1	9	-	-	6	-	-	2
Total (round numbers)	20	470	100	45	3	21	5	9	-	40	50	4	-	6	-	-	2
<u>3 Battalions each of:</u>																	
Staff and Command Plat. (3)	5	75	15	5	1	2	-	-	-	1	10	-	-	-	-	-	-
3 Rifle Companies, each of:	4	190	5	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	5	12	-	-	1	-	-
1 Bn. Accompanying Weapons Company (4)	4	205	40	35	-	1	-	-	-	-	5	-	16	2	-	-	2
Total per Battalion	20	845	65	50	1	6	-	-	-	1	30	36	16	2	3	2	2
Total per Regiment	80	3000	290	190	6	40	5	9	-	40	140	112	48	12	9	8	8

Notes: (1) For ammunition supply.

(2) 1 Command Platoon, 3 chenillettes; 2-25mm. Anti-tank Plats. of 3 guns each;  
1 Squad. of 2-81mm. mortars.

(3) Composition: 1 Command Plat. of: 1st Group - Communications, information,  
2d " - Supply and Services,  
3d " - 1-60mm. mortar.

4 Rifle Scout Platoons.

(4) Composition: 1 Command Plat. (same as Rifle Co.), 4 M.G. Plats. (16 M.G.), 1 Weapons Plat. of:  
1-25mm. A.T. Squad (2 guns);  
1-81mm. Mortar Squad (2 mortars).

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31(b) War Strength Infantry Regiment (Motorized Type) 1939.

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Animals	Vehicles (H-d.)	Liaison	Motor Vehicles				Motorcycles	Bicycles	Collective Armament			
						Light Trucks	Trucks	Chenillettes	Trailers			L.M.G.	M.G.	25mm. Anti- tank Cannon	60mm. Mortar
<u>REGIMENTAL:</u>															
Staff and Command Company	10	170	-	-	5	7	1	-	1	20	3	-	-	-	-
Service Company	5	175	-	-	3	20	17	6	1	10	2	-	-	-	-
Motorcycle Company (1)	4	140	-	-	1	9	2	-	1	50	-	8	8	-	-
Regtl. M.G. & Accompanying Weapons Co. (2)	5	205	16	16	1	2	1	6	1	6	2	-	12	6	4
Total (round numbers)	25	700	16	16	10	40	20	12	4	85	10	8	20	6	4
<u>3 Battalions each of:</u>															
Staff and Command Plat.	4	56	-	-	1	6	-	-	-	4	1	-	-	-	-
3 Rifle Cos., each of: (3)	4	170	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	2	2	11	-	-	1
1 Accompanying Weapons Co. (4)	4	168	14	14	-	3	1	2	1	3	2	-	12	2	2
Total per Battalion	20	750	17	17	1	12	4	2	4	15	10	33	12	2	2
Total per Regiment (round numbers)	90	3000	70	70	13	75	33	18	16	120	35	107	56	12	10

- Notes: (1) Composition: 1 Command Plat.; 1 Mtl. Plat, Light Type (13 motorcycles, sidecars); 2 Mtl. Plats., Heavy Type (each 13 motorcycles, sidecars); 1 M.G. Plat. on Light Trucks (4 M.G.'s).
- (2) Composition: 1 Command Plat.; 3 M.G. Plats. (4 M.G.'s each); 2 A.T. Plats. (3-25mm. A.T. cannon each); 1 Mortar Plat. of 2-81mm. squads each of 2 mortars.
- (3) Composition: Same as Normal Type:- the C.O., not mounted, has a motorcycle sidecar. The 60mm. Mortar replaces a Rifle Squad in one of the Rifle Plats.
- (4) Composition: 1 Command Plat.; the C.O. has 1 motorcycle sidecar. 3 M.G. Plats. (4 M.G.'s each); 1 Weapons Plat.: 1-25mm. A.T. Squad (2 cannon); 1-81mm. Mortar Squad (2 mortars).

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(4) Tanks. In general tanks are in G.H.Q. Reserve. Prior to September 3, 1939 (declaration of war against Germany), there were 11 regiments of tanks, composed of 2 battalions of 3 companies each, and 4 battalions in Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and the Levant. The battalion is the largest unit of tanks whose war strength and organization is prescribed. When circumstances require, however, several battalions may be grouped under command of a colonel who is provided with a staff of 3 officers and a command platoon including 24 enlisted men, 3 autos, 2 trucks and 2 motorcycles.

Tank production has been stressed since the outbreak of the present war with Germany, and the number of battalions is reported as follows:

8	Battalions	FT,
32	"	Hotchkiss and Renault,
2	"	F.C.M.,
4	"	D (1 in France - 3 in Africa),
6	"	Somua,
6	"	D-bis. There will be 8 by the end of March and a battalion per month thereafter until the end of June 1940.

War Organization, Battalion of Light Tanks (F.T., Type NE).

ELEMENTS	Off.	Men	Tanks	Autos	Trucks		Motor-
					Tractors	Trailers	cycles
Staff & Command Platoon	5	35	-	5	3	-	2
Service Company (1)	5	135	-	4	35	7	2
3 Combat Companies (2) each of:	5	120	21	2	4	6	2
Total Battalion	25	530	63	15	50	25	10

- Notes: (1) 1st Section - Services.  
2d Section - Wrecking Service.  
3d Section - Shops.  
4th Section - Supply (including ammunition).  
(2) Command Platoon, 3 Combat Platoons, 1 Service Echelon.  
(1 squad on treads; 1 squad on wheels.)

War Organization, Battalion of Medium Tanks (Types D).

ELEMENTS	Off.	Men	Tanks	Autos	Trucks		Motor-
					Tractors	Trailers	cycles
Staff & Command Platoon	7	40	-	4	5	-	5
Service Company (1)	4	160	6	5	35	1	5

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ELEMENTS	Off.	Men	Tanks	Autos	Trucks Tractors	Trailers	Motor- cycles
3 Combat Companies (2) each of:	6	130	13	2	15	1	15
Total Battalion	30	600	45	15	85	4	55

Repair Section (Attached  
to this Battalion from - 30 - - 10 - -  
Army Tank Park.)

Notes: (1) 1st Section - Services.  
2d Section - Shops and wrecking.  
3d Section - Replacement.  
4th Section - Supply (including ammunition).  
(2) Command Platoon, 4 Combat Platoons, 1 Service Echelon.-  
(1 squad cross-country type, 1 squad on wheels.)

War Organization, Battalion of Medium Tanks (Hotchkiss '39-13 ton):

ELEMENTS	Off.	Men	Tanks	Comments
Staff & Command Platoon	:	:	:	(1 Tank for Battalion Commander.
1 Service Company (1)	:	:	2	(1 " " Second in Command.
3 Combat Companies each of (2)	:	:	13	:
Total Battalion	30	550	45	:

Notes: (1) Has 4 Sections:- Service, Repair, Replacement (4 tanks)  
and Supply.  
(2) Command Platoon, 3 Combat Platoons, 1 Service Echelon.

War Organization, Battalion of B-bis - 33.3 Ton Tanks:

ELEMENTS	Off.	Men	Tanks	Comments
Staff & Command Platoon	6	32	2	(1 Tank for Battalion Commander.
	:	:	:	(1 " " Second in Command.
1 Service Company (1)	:	:	3(2)	3 Tanks for replacement.
3 Combat Companies each of:	:	:	10	:
Total Battalion	50	610	35	:

Notes: (1) Has 4 Sections:- Service, Repair, Replacement and Supply.  
(2) Number of replacement tanks is one at present, but is expected  
shortly to be increased to three.

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There also exist a number of motor transport companies for the transportation by truck of light and medium tanks.

(5) Cavalry.

(a) Composition of the Cavalry. Peacetime cavalry units authorized by law or decrees are as follows:

Classification	Type	Regiments	Battalions	Battalions of Armored Cars
<u>Metropolitan Cavalry</u>	Horse	24	-	-
	Dragons Portes	2	3	-
	Armored Cars	3	-	5
	Spahis	4	-	-
	Total	33	3	5
<u>African Cavalry</u>	Chasseurs d'Afrique	5	-	-
	Spahis: Algeria	3	-	-
	Tunisia	1	-	-
	Morocco	3	-	-
	Levant	1	-	-
	Foreign Legion	1	-	-
	Armored Car	-	-	-
	Units: Levant	-	-	1
	Grand Total	47	3	6

(b) Regiment. The horse cavalry regiment is composed of a staff, a command platoon, a service troop, a machine gun and weapons troop, 2 squadrons of 2 troops each. The peace strength (variable) is 28 officers and 800 men.

War Strength Organization - Regiment (horse).

ELEMENTS	Officers	Men	Horses	Vehicles (H-d.)	Autos (Liaison)	Trucks	Motorcycles	Collective Armament			
								L.M.G.	M.G.	25mm. A.T. Cannon	60mm. Mortar
Rifle Platoon (1)	1	35	40	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-
Rifle Troop (2)	5	175	180	-	-	4	2	12	-	-	-
Rifle Squadron (3)	11	360	365	-	-	8	6	24	-	-	-
M.G. Platoon (4)	1	45	55	4	-	-	-	-	5	-	-
Anti-Tank Cannon Squad (5)	1	30	35	2	-	-	1	-	-	2	-
60mm. Mortar Platoon (6)	1	35	45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
M.C. & Weapons Troop (7)	6	210	230	12	1	5	4	-	10	4	4
Total Cavalry Regiment (8)	40	1100	1000	12	6	46	25	48	10	4	4

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ORGANIZATION - (Notes from preceding page)

- (1) 2 Combat groups and 1 rifle squad (3 L.M.G.).
- (2) 1 Command platoon and 4 Rifle platoons.
- (3) 1 Squadron Staff and 2 Rifle troops.
- (4) 2 squads each of 2 M.G. (plus 1 for A.A.) on horse-drawn vehicles.
- (5) 2-25mm. cannon on horse-drawn vehicles.
- (6) 2 mortar squads of 2 mortars each, on pack animals.
- (7) 1 Command platoon, 2 M.G. platoons, 2 Anti-Tank cannon squads, 1-60mm. Mortar Platoon.
- (8) 1 Staff, 1 service troop, 2 rifle squadrons, 1 M.G. and Weapons Troop.

War Strength Organization - Battalion of Dragons Portes  
(Motorized Cavalry), Cavalry Division.

(On cross-country vehicles, 7-man type)

ELEMENTS	Officers	Men	Autos (Liaison)	Trucks	Cross-country Motor Vehicles	Motorcycles	Collective Armament				
							L.M.G.	M.G.	25mm. A.T. Cannon	60mm. Mortar	81mm. Mortar
Rifle Platoon (1)	1	45	-	-	7	1	6	-	-	-	-
M. G. Platoon (2)	1	30	-	-	5	1	-	5	-	-	-
60mm. Mortar	-	7	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-
Rifle Troop (3)	5	200	2	4	32	11	18	5	-	1	-
81mm. Mortar Platoon (4)	1	36	-	-	5	2	-	-	-	-	4
Anti-Tank Cannon Squad (5)	1	25	1	2	5	4	-	-	2	-	-
M.G. & Weapons Troop (6)	6	200	4	10	30	20	-	10	4	-	4
Motorcycle Troop (7)	5	145	2	6	-	70	16	-	-	1	-
Total Battalion	32	1000	18	65	100	135	52	20	4	3	4
Dragons Portes									(4 AA)		

ORGANIZATION -

- (1) 3 Combat Groups, each of 2 L.M.G.
- (2) 2 Squads of 2 M.G. each, plus 1 A.A.
- (3) 1 Command Plat.; 3 Rifle Plats.; 1 M.G. Plat.; 1-60mm. Mortar.
- (4) 2 Squads of 2 Mortars each.
- (5) 2-25mm. A.T. Cannon, motorized.
- (6) 1 Command Plat.; 2 M.G. Plats.; 1-81mm. Mortar Plat.; 2 A.T. Cannon Squads.
- (7) 1 Command Plat.; 4 Rifle Plats.; 1-60mm. Mortar.
- (8) 1 Bn. Staff; 1 Service Troop; 1 Motorcycle Troop; 2 Rifle Troops; 1 M.G. and Weapons Troop.

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War Strength Organization - Armored Car Regiment (Cavalry Div.).

ELEMENTS	Officers	E. M.	Motor Vehicles					Collective Armament					
			Liaison	Trucks and Lt. Trucks	Combat	Command	Motorcycles	L.M.G.	60mm. Mortar	Armored Cars			
										Distant Rec.	Close-in Rec.	Combat	
Motorcycle Rifle													
Plat. (1)	1	25	-	-	-	-	13	4	-	-	-	-	-
60mm. Mortar	-	4	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	-
Motorcycle Troop (2)	5	145	2	6	-	-	70	16	1	-	-	-	-
Distant Rec.													
A.C. Plat. (3)	1	15	1	-	3	-	2	-	-	3	-	-	-
Distant Rec.													
A.C. Troop (4)	5	120	5	6	12	1	20	-	-	12	-	-	-
Distant Rec.													
A.C. Squadron (5)	17	400	15	18	12	2	165	32	2	12	-	-	-
Close-in Rec.													
A.C. Plat. (6)	1	12	-	-	5	-	3	-	-	-	5	-	-
Close-in Rec.													
A.C. Troop (7)	5	110	2	7	20	1	25	-	-	-	20	-	-
Combat A.C.													
Plat. (8)	1	11	-	-	3	-	3	-	-	-	-	3	-
Combat A. C.													
Troop (9)	5	110	2	7	12	1	25	-	-	-	-	12	-
Close-in Rec. and )													
Combat A. C. )	17	350	7	21	52	4	80	-	-	-	40	12	-
Squadron (10)													
(11)													
Armored Car Regiment	46	1000	32	85	64	7	270	32	2	12	40	12	-

REMARKS: Figures shown do not include.- Antiaircraft M.G.'s, extra weapons armored car armament nor extra vehicles (2 per Armored Car Troop).

- (1) 2 Squads each of 2 L.M.G.'s.
- (2) 1 Command Plat., 4 Motorcycle Rifle Plats., 1-60mm. Mortar.
- (3) 3 Distant Rec. Armored Cars.
- (4) 1 Command Plat. and 4 Distant Rec. A. C. Plats.
- (5) 1 Sq. Staff, 2 Motorcycle Troops, 1 Distant Rec. A. C. Troop.
- (6) 5 Close-in Rec. Armored Cars.
- (7) 1 Command Plat., 4 Close-in Rec. A. C. Plats.
- (8) 3 Combat Armored Cars.
- (9) 1 Command Plat. and 4 Combat A. C. Plats.
- (10) 1 Sq. Staff, 2 Close-in Rec. A. C. Troops, 1 Combat A. C. Troop.
- (11) 1 Regtl. Staff, 1 Distant Rec. A. C. Squadron, 1 Close-in Rec. and Combat A. C. Squadron.

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(6) Artillery (France and North Africa).(a) Composition (Prior to September 3, 1939, declaration of war on Germany).

36 Regts. horse-drawn (28 divisional)  
 21 " auto (15 divisional)  
 3 " mountain artillery (2 divisional)  
 5 " fortress artillery  
 1 " heavy R. R. artillery  
 7 " A. A. artillery  
 2 Autonomous Battalions (1 sound and flash, 1 school)  
 10 Battalions of artillery workmen  
 11 Companies and 8 Sections of artillery workmen  
 attached to regiments.

(b) Organization of Divisional Regiment (75mm.). The divisional artillery regiments are composed of 3 battalions, each of 3 batteries of 4 - 75mm. guns each; total 36 - 75mm. guns; and 2 battalions of 3 batteries of 4 - 155mm. howitzers each; total 24 - 155mm. howitzers.

The Divisional regiment (75mm.) horse-drawn, comprises:- headquarters, headquarters battery, and 3 battalions (65 officers, 2100 men, 1800 animals, 266 horse-drawn vehicles, 19 liaison autos, 35 trucks, 4 motorcycles and 68 bicycles - war strength).

The battalion consists of:- headquarters, supply column (Supply and Ammunition Train) and 3 batteries (20 officers, 650 men, 575 animals, 87 horse-drawn vehicles, 5 liaison autos, 8 trucks, 1 motorcycle and 21 bicycles - war strength).

The battery consists of 4 guns and 6 caissons.

The divisional regiment (155mm. howitzer) horse-drawn comprises:- headquarters, headquarters battery, and 2 battalions (45 officers, 1675 men, 1325 animals, 187 horse-drawn vehicles, 14 liaison autos, 29 trucks, 3 motorcycles and 47 bicycles - war strength).

The battalion consists of headquarters, supply and ammunition train, and 3 batteries (20 officers, 750 men, 650 animals, 91 horse-drawn vehicles, 5 liaison autos, 9 trucks, 1 motorcycle and 21 bicycles - war strength).

The battery comprises 4 howitzers and 4 caissons (8 horses per howitzer, 6 horses per caisson).

The motorized divisional artillery (war strength) has a considerably reduced enlisted personnel:- the 75mm. gun regiment totaling 70 officers, 1660 men, 59 liaison autos (27 cross-country type), 130 tractors (124 cross-country type), 143 trucks, 69 motorcycles and 22 bicycles; the 155mm. howitzer regiment totaling 50 officers, 1260 men, 42 liaison autos (19 cross-country type), 82 tractors (78 cross-country type), 116 trucks, 48 motorcycles and 15 bicycles.

The divisional anti-tank battery, horse-drawn (war strength) comprises 4 officers, 190 men, 175 animals, 24 horse-drawn vehicles, 2 liaison autos, 6 gun trailers, 6 ammunition trailers (or caissons), 6 motorcycles, 1 bicycle and 6 - 75mm. cannon.

The divisional anti-tank battery, motorized (war strength) comprises 4 officers, 140 men, 4 liaison cars, 13 tractors (cross-country type)

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11 trucks, 6 gun trailers, 6 ammunition trailers (or caissons), 1 additional trailer, 6 motorcycles and 6 - 75mm. cannon.

(7) Engineers. Engineer troops consist of:

- 13 Regiments - 7 sapper miners
- 2 railway engineers
- 3 telegraphists
- 1 mixed

4 Independent separate battalions of native North African sappers

The aggregate number of companies which go to constitute regiments and separate units is divided as follows:

- 64 companies of sapper miners and specialist sappers
- 5 companies of cyclist sappers
- 17 companies of railway sappers
- 30 companies of telegraphist and radio-telegraphist sappers
- 1 pigeon detachment
- 5 companies of engineer sapper workmen.

Signal Troops are Engineers under the name of Transmission Service. There is no separate Signal Corps in time of peace.

(8) Chemical Warfare Service. There is no separate chemical warfare service in the French Army but the War Ministry is now seriously studying the advisability of creating such a "Direction of Chemical Warfare" in order to assemble under single control the at present widely scattered chemical warfare activities. These are now divided among four separate agencies as follows:

(a) A central bureau in the War Ministry under a general officer called "General Inspector of Chemical Studies and Experiments", who directs all research, development and experimentation.

(b) A Combat Gas Service with the armies in the field, headed by a general officer who is on the staff of the commander-in-chief and who supervises all chemical activities in the theater of operations.

(c) A technical section which makes practical application of research and development, by drawing up designs and formulating specifications, which is part of the Directions of Artillery, Infantry, Engineers, etc.

(d) A chemical section under the Direction of Armament Manufactures which supervises and coordinates the work of quantity production of chemical warfare material at government arsenals and private plants.

The agencies also perform the necessary chemical warfare work of the Navy and Air Ministry. The commander in each combat echelon is responsible for all measures to insure protection against chemical attack. Special personnel are detailed on the staff of each unit for this purpose. The field army has a chemical officer known as "The Inspector Z" assisted by an "Officer-Chemist" and an "Officer-Z". In all units down to and including the battalion there is a staff officer designated as an "Officer-Z". Units below the battalion have specially trained enlisted men known as "Scouts-Z" and also decontamination squads. According to official information, there are at present no chemical warfare troops in the French Army. Unofficially, it is confidentially reported that certain units of chemical experimental troops do exist, camouflaged as engineers, who are used to carry out tests of gas attack apparatus and gas tactics.

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(9) The Train. The Train is an independent arm. It takes charge of all transportation (other than regimental and ammunition sections) as far back as the zone of the army extends.

The number of the squadrons and companies of the train are as follows:

17	squadrons	(France)
3	"	Algeria
1	"	Tunisia
4	"	Morocco
1	"	Levant
7	regional Cos.	

e. Services. A sharp distinction is made in the French Army between combat troops and services. Military titles such as colonel, captain, etc., are given only to personnel with combat troops. Corresponding grades in the services are identified by nonmilitary or other distinguishing titles. Some changes in titles of officers or services have been authorized such as "Capitaine Medecin," "Commandant Medecin," etc., (Captain-Doctor, Major-Doctor) but this is not general in other services. There is no counterpart to the American Inspector General's Department, although minor inspections of accounts, records, property, interior routine, clerical work, etc., are made by officers of what is called the Bureau of Control, a substitute for part of the Inspector General's Department, Adjutant General's Department, and Finance Department in the United States Army. The head of the Judge Advocate General's Department is a civilian lawyer. There is no Ordnance Department; theory and study of Ordnance and its manufacture are in the hands of the "Technical Section of Artillery," and the manufacture of explosives and munitions is under the charge of the Bureau of Explosives. Each service is represented at division, corps and army Headquarters. The service of an arm is part of that arm.

(1) Supply and Maintenance include the Veterinary, Treasury and Pay Department, Post Office, Quartermaster (Intendance), Medical Service and a part of supply of the artillery, engineers and aviation. The conduct of the services that have corresponding combatant detachments is under the direction of the officers controlling the respective combat arms.

(a) Quartermaster (Intendance Service) includes a cadre of intendance and administrative officers. The Intendance Service maintains: 10 supply depots; 14 clothing, camp equipment and saddlery stores; and a number of testing factories.

(b) The Medical Service includes approximately 1,700 officers, including pharmacists and dentists; a cadre of medical administrative officers; 24 sections of hospital attendants (of which 5 sections are for North Africa) and a colonial section. The total strength of these hospital sections is 4,070 French and 620 colonials.

(2) The Transport Service. This includes the railway and narrow gauge railway service, automobile and horse-drawn train, canals and rivers.

(3) Law and Order. Military Police, Gendarmerie and Courts-martial.

(4) Service "Des Etapes". Controls the intermediate zone between Corps Zones and Zone of Interior. Administered by Commander of army or group of armies.

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(5) Recruiting Service. The Recruiting Service organizes and maintains the recruiting bureaus which are the military links between the civil registration offices and the mobilization centers. They keep all records of drafted individuals and reservists and assign them to mobilization centers. They are permanent local draft boards.

f. Second Line Forces. In principle the second line reservists on mobilization provide the line of communication and supply troops and, generally speaking, the troops required for the various national mobilization services. The second reserve consists of men between the ages of 40 and 48 years.

4. Equipment.

a. Individual. The individual infantryman carries a pack which weighs between 66.14 and 70.7 pounds. In the haversack is packed: 1 shirt, 1 drawers, 1 handkerchief, 1 towel, 1 housewife, 1 pair socks, fatigue cap, soap, reserve ration, cleaning kit. Wrapped around the haversack is 1 shelter half, 1 blanket, 1 pair shoes, entrenching tools.

b. Organizational. In the French army today, emphasis is placed upon the development of organizational equipment to keep pace with the development of motor vehicles, so as to organize fast moving units with adequate armament and great flexibility. The greatest progress in the changes in organizational equipment has taken place in the cavalry. At present, in each of the cavalry divisions there is a battalion of dragons portes which are cavalymen carried in motor vehicles and a troop of armored cars. The war strength division will include a regiment of armored cars and battalion of dragons portes. Two of the five cavalry divisions have already been converted into light mechanized divisions and a third cavalry division is now in the process of being so converted.

In the infantry division motorization has been directed principally to supply agencies. A motorized mount has been developed for the Stokes-Brandt mortar and 37mm. gun. Divisional field artillery has been partially motorized. The "chenillette", a low relief tractor, with trailer, forms part of the organization of divisional infantry and anti-tank cannon companies, as well as of that of the Chasseur a Pied and machine gun battalions, for use as ammunition carriers.

c. Tactical - (Armament).

(1) Infantry. The infantry is at present armed with the Lebel rifle, model 16, weight 7.21 lbs. An excellent steel jacket lead-antimony core bullet is to be used in the future. Armor piercing and tracer bullets are provided. This rifle is now being replaced by a lighter, shorter and sturdier one, designated as model 1936, caliber 7.5mm. Other individual weapons are: pistol, carbine, bayonet, hand grenade, rifle grenade, and lance grenade. This latter is a grenade thrower, 50mm. light mortar carried by one man; one is being issued to each rifle platoon. Collective weapons are: Hotchkiss machine gun, model 1914; Stokes-Brandt, model 1928; 81mm. mortar; 60mm. mortar; 37mm. gun, model 1916; Chatellerault automatic rifle, model 1921, modified 1929. The 25mm. Hotchkiss antitank gun is now standard. The 37mm. semi-automatic and 47mm. antitank guns are being considered.

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Tanks. There are a number of different types of tanks in service. The current trend is toward the replacement of the light tank by a more heavily armored medium type. The following figures of tanks on hand are estimates only:

Renault FT - weight 6-7 tons, wartime model . . . .	2,200
Renault HC - " 7 " , 1928, a moderniza- tion of the Renault FT . . . . .	150
Renault ZB - weight 4.4 tons; armament 1 - 7.5mm. M. G.; limited standard; number on hand . .	Unknown
ZT Model - weight 7.2 tons; armament 1 - 47mm. cannon and 1 - 7.5mm. M. G.; experimental for use with cavalry; number on hand . . .	Unknown
R-35 - weight 12 tons; armament 1 - 37 (or 47) mm.) cannon, 1 - 7.5 M. G. )	
H-35 - weight 12 tons; armament:- Same )	
H-39 - weight 13 tons (approximate); armament same, except that a more powerful 37mm. ) gun will replace present 37mm. gun. )	2,200
Note: Production rate of Hotchkiss and Renault Tanks is at present at 200 units per month. )	
D Type - weight 13 tons, armament same as H-35. . .	190
F.C.M. - accompanying tank; weight 12 tons; arma- ment 1 - 37mm. cannon, 1 - 7.5mm. M. G. Production has been stopped on this type. .	90
AMC - R 35 - weight 16.5 tons; armament same . . .	75
Cavalry tank - weight 20 tons; armament, 1 - 47mm. cannon, 1 - 7.5 mm. M. G. . . . .	210
Limited production of this type. )	
B Tank - weight 29-35 tons; armament: 1 - 75mm. cannon, 1 - 47mm. cannon, 2 - 7.5 mm. ) M. G.'s. )	
B-bis Tank - weight 33.3 tons; armament: same as for the B Tank. This Tank is the con- ventional B Tank, but more heavily armor- ed and with a more powerful engine. Pro- duction rate at present is 2 to 3 units per day. )	415
Note: Emphasis is now being placed on the production of the Hotchkiss, Renault and D-bis types.	
C Tank - weight 70 tons; experimental type; no more being constructed; armament: 1 - 75mm. cannon, 4 - 7.5mm. M. G.'s . . . . .	25

(2) Cavalry. Individual armament consists of the Lebel carbine, pistol, saber. Collective armament consists of 37mm. gun in armored cars, Hotchkiss machine gun, 60mm. mortar, 81mm. mortar, 25mm. antitank gun, automatic rifle, model 24M29. There is a possibility that a lanceo grenade.

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regiment. This model has split trail, traverse of 960 mils., maximum range 13,200 yards and is horse-drawn. A still newer weapon, the 105mm. howitzer, M 1935, Bourges, is under experimentation.

Corps artillery comprises the 155mm. gun (not G.P.F.) and the 105mm. gun. Eight hundred of the former are reported active and in reserve. A new 105mm. gun, M 1936, has been designed and approved. It has split trail, 960 mils. traverse, maximum range 17,600 yards, rate of fire 5 rounds per minute, and is tractor-drawn.

There is no type army artillery. G.H.Q. reserve artillery is of all calibers and methods of traction and includes one regiment of railway artillery.

(4) Engineer. As troops, engineers are not formally armed or trained for fighting; they are intended to serve as construction or technical troops except in case of extreme emergency and therefore carry only a light carbine and two machine guns per company for local defense.

(5) Means and Sufficiency of Transportation. Animals, horse-drawn vehicles and motor vehicles are mobilized by requisition, all are registered and subject to call.

(a) Horse raising receives government supervision and assistance. The census of livestock in 1935 returned: horses, 2,810,000; asses, 210,590; mules, 123,020.

(b) Animal-drawn vehicles remaining from the war are ample for ordinary needs supplemented by requisition.

(c) Motor vehicles. As of January 1, 1939, these are estimated at 2,736,440, of which 1,715,000 are passenger cars; 38,900 (400 Diesel) busses; 467,400 (17,400 Diesel) trucks; and 485,140 motorcycles.

## 5. Training, Efficiency and Morale.

### a. Training.

(1) Military Schools. The various categories of military schools are as follows: Preparatory schools (9); development schools (10); schools of application (7); advanced and specialist schools (10); schools of higher military training (4).

Their methods may be summarized as follows:

1. The instruction is realistic. Tactical situations are made as real as possible. Artificial situations are avoided. Terrain studies play an important part in all tactical studies. There is a constant interchange between schools and troops, which keeps the schools practical.
2. Schools are not well organized materially. The quality of their instruction is superior.
3. Instruction at the technical schools is theoretical where ours is essentially practical.

(2) Nature and Objective of Training for Officers. The reorganization of the army has caused a marked change in the nature of training an officer gets for now he must not only be a unit commander but an instructor as well. Methods of instruction figure prominently in the courses at the schools of application. Officers in reinforced units or in Africa get valuable experience in command. Every time an officer passes from one grade to another

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he gets a refresher course to fit him for his new grade. Immediately on promotion an officer gets two years' actual command in new grade. Officers serving away from troops are given annual opportunity to exercise the appropriate command of their grades with troops. Training therefore accomplishes two missions:

- (a) It prepares officers for combat.
- (b) It classifies them according to their ability.
- (3) Nature and Objective of Training for Men. These differ for the professional soldier and for the drafted man.

The professional soldier is a potential noncommissioned officer or officer, his peacetime mission is primarily to instruct, his wartime mission is leadership. It follows that his training tends to specialization through schools and in his units. The object is to form a professional soldier as good or better than the Reichswehr soldier.

The training of the drafted man is worthy of detailed consideration. The battalion is the training unit. It contains one recruit rifle company, one veteran rifle company and one accompanying weapons company. The artillery battalion contains a similar recruit and veteran battery. The cadre of the recruit company is made up of regulars. A drafted man spends six months in this company. He is trained in the school of the soldier, the squad, and platoon. The first four months are intended to make the individual "mobilizable", the next two months make the platoon "mobilizable", that is, itself able to annex reservists and take the field as a working part of the next higher echelon. The recruit does no fatigue and his training is intensive. The next six months his company is the "veteran company", and he completes his training up to the company. On arrival of the reservists his battalion is filled up and he receives three or more weeks' training in a camp with the full battalion as a maneuvering unit operating with other units. The two-year period of service now in effect, and to continue until 1940 and subsequent years, will double the training of the draftee.

The object of the training is to eliminate everything except combat duties from the instruction and turn out a capable rifleman or runner in one year. Drafted men with certain certificates of previous military and academic training are at once sent to reserve noncommissioned officer and officer schools.

(4) Unit and Combined Training. The battalion is the medium for imparting this form of combat training and except in the reinforced regiments and the regiments of the expeditionary and overseas forces, this training is limited to the periods when the reservists are called back to the colors. However, at this time the units are all in camps and the time is entirely devoted to training. The first reservists are usually called back in the months of April-May, and then throughout the summer for some arms, with a large group under the colors in the fall. During the spring period battalion and regimental maneuvers take place, and in the fall maneuvers of larger units are carried out. It is during these periods that new ideas are given practical tests.

(5) Training of Reserves. The Minister of War has directed that reservists will not be used for any purpose that will interfere with training them for their combat duties. All administrative arrangements and training

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plans are made so that the men will receive intensive combat instruction from the day they report until the period is over.

b. Preliminary Training and Reserve Officers' Training. Preliminary training of young men prior to their call to active service is carried out in:

(1) Sporting clubs, societies and groups under the patronage of the Minister of War, under the Secretary for Physical Education (Elementary Military Preparation).

(2) Colleges, universities and higher technical schools (Superior Military Preparation).

Boys who join a club where elementary military training is given, and who win the certificate for this training have the right to choose the regiment in which they will serve their active duty, and on reporting are ranked ahead of all other men of the contingent. They may at once enter the platoon for student corporals and may be promoted to the grade of corporal after four months' service. They may also contract an enlistment before being called to the colors which entitles them to increased pay for all time spent in the army over the normal period.

The superior military preparation is given along with academic work, as in our colleges, and lasts the length of the academic course. The student is examined at completion of the military course and if he receives a diploma he is, on incorporation, admitted to a platoon of reserve student officers at one of the military academies. On graduation from this platoon the student officer is commissioned a reserve second lieutenant and does the remainder of his service with a regiment. Approximately 3,000 reserve student officers are taken into the service each year; of whom 1,700 are commissioned.

c. System of Promotion for Officers. Promotion is by length of service and selection, as follows:

2d lieutenant to 1st lieutenant by seniority after 2 years' service

1st lieutenant to captain, one-third by selection, two-thirds by seniority after a minimum of two years

Captain to major, one-half by selection and one-half by seniority, after a minimum of four years

Major to lieutenant colonel, selection only, after a minimum of three years

Lieutenant colonel to colonel and up, selection only, after a minimum of two years.

The selection lists are made out annually starting with the company or battery commanders who list the lieutenants, and are passed through every intermediate headquarters to the army corps headquarters and thence to the Ministry of War. In this way the judgment of commanding officers at every echelon is given for each of his subordinates. An unsatisfactory officer may reach the grade of major but he cannot go beyond it.

d. Efficiency.

(1) Officers. As a rule, French officers are well instructed and keen professionally. They are industrious and intelligent. Their tendency is toward individualism.

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(2) Men. The French soldier is an individualist and has a sharp intelligence which serves him well in the army. His education and physical condition have improved in the last twenty years. He has a great military tradition of which he is aware, and the intense love of country in the Frenchman makes him a fine soldier although he is opposed to war and to militarism.

(3) Combat Efficiency and Value as a Whole. The necessities of the defense of the frontier and of the system for incorporating and training the drafts have combined to reduce the number of divisions that should be immediately available.

The divisions in the fortified region are of the reinforced type. The special demands of the covering troops have in a sense committed an important part of the active army to a fixed theater of war.

The divisions of the interior have certain skeleton units within the artillery and infantry regiments. When these divisions are in camp with their attached reservists they may be considered available for immediate use as efficient combat divisions, but at other times they need a period to reconstitute inactive units.

e. Morale. The officers and men are well cared for materially. The pay is small but the conditions of life are such that they can live respectably. Morale in general is good, especially since the reorganization which has provided for fewer units, for the elimination of fatigue duty for recruits, the improvement in rations and masses, increase of pay, the restoration of the prestige of the army, and the discontinuance of the use of the army for internal disorders, made possible by an increase in the Garde Mobile. On the other hand morale was impaired in late years among the professional troops by the system of incorporating the recruits semi-annually. The reservists produced by one year's service were considered considerably inferior to those of longer training. A recent law has extended the two-year period of service to the year 1940 and to subsequent years.

In a war for the defense of the country, the army would march with the highest morale. The nation is opposed to war but the people have been spiritually prepared to expect it, and their morale will sustain the greatest strain and shock. Pacifist and communist propaganda have not seriously affected the basic patriotism of the French soldier.

#### 6. Mobilization Plan.

##### a. Method of Recruitment

##### (1) Officers.

(a) Active Officers. Commissioned officers are procured from the following sources:

Graduates of St. Cyr and the Ecole Polytechnique  
Graduates of the noncommissioned student officers' school  
By direct nomination of noncommissioned or warrant officers  
By nomination of reserve officers.

Graduates agree to serve 10 years beyond the duration of their course at St. Cyr and those at the Ecole Polytechnique, two years. Those who fail to meet the scholarship requirements must serve at least one

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year as enlisted men in the army. Noncommissioned officers are admitted to student officers' schools by competitive examination, after at least two years' service. Those noncommissioned officers selected directly for a commission are chosen each year from the higher noncommissioned grades who have at least eight years' service. Reserve officers may apply for a commission in the active army after taking certain school courses.

(b) Reserve Officers. Reserve officers are obtained as follows: From officers who have resigned or been retired from the active army; from military men who are doing their active service and who also satisfy conditions fixed by law for admission to the reserve officers' corps; from noncommissioned officers in the reserve who served as sergeants in the active army and who have five years of active service, including their periods of obligatory or voluntary service; from noncommissioned officers who, on the expiration of their active service or during the period of instruction, obtained the certificate of "chief of section or platoon"; from foreigners who served as officers in the French Army during a campaign or who served in the Allied Armies and have become naturalized Frenchmen.

To train conscripts for a commission, preparatory platoons for reserve officers are maintained; admission takes place after a special examination. The duration of instruction in these platoons is six months, after which proficient candidates are promoted to platoons of candidate officers of reserve. The duration of the instruction in these platoons is six months; at the end of this period there is a competitive examination for reserve officers' commission; those who pass, at the end of their active service, are made officers or noncommissioned officers of reserve.

In certain schools, universities and other institutions, a course of military instruction is given, having for its object the preparation of candidates for reserve officers' commissions. The program, in general, covers two years. Each contingent yields about 1,800 reserve second lieutenants. The total commissioned each year is about 2,000. Reserve officers remain subject to call until they pass into the second reserve. The total number of reserve officers is estimated at 133,365 and the number of noncommissioned officers at 298,421.

(2) Men. The active army is recruited:

(a) By calling the annual class.

(b) By enlistments and by reenlistments.

Length of service:	Active army	2 years
	"Disponibilite"	2 "
	1st Reserve	16 "
	2d Reserve	8 "
	Total	28

Enlistments may be made at the age of 18 for periods of 18 months, two, three, four or five years.

Men are at present called for the active army at 20 years in the annual contingent: Approximately 81 per cent of the male births recorded come before the examining boards in their 20th year. The Minister of National Defense and War has been recently authorized to take steps for the progressive return to the incorporation of drafted men of 21 years of age.

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The "Disponibilite" comprises the two junior classes subject to active duty in case of national emergency and without mobilization being declared.

Training periods are fixed as follows: Reserve officers, total 4 months; Disponibilite, 3 weeks. Enlisted men: Reserve N.C.O.'s and privates in Disponibilite and 1st and 2d reserves, except under special circumstances, periods not to exceed 21 days, with total duration not to exceed 10 weeks. Reserve officers of Disponibilite and 1st reserve, and reserve N.C.O.'s of Disponibilite and first 12 classes of the reserve will, in addition to their compulsory or voluntary periods of training, attend 12 instruction periods of one-half day each at perfecting schools.

Normally the annual class consists of about 250,000 youths. Due to the decrease in births during the War, however, the annual classes from 1935 to 1940 will not average over 125,000. This deficiency caused a modification of the one-year service law so as to require an active service training period of two years to include 1939. A recent law has extended the two-year period of service to the year 1940 (when 220,000 men will be drafted) and to subsequent years. At the present time the part of the class having completed its active service obligations may be retained temporarily with the colors, and men belonging to the Disponibilite and the Reserves (officers, N.C.O.'s, enlisted men and men holding special assignments) may be called to the colors and retained beyond their regulation period. During the year 1940 and subsequent years, a recent law has authorized the Minister of National Defense and War to discharge before the completion of their compulsory service certain categories who have been retained with the colors.

Professional Soldiers. When the one-year law was passed, France adopted a system of permanent cadres of professional soldiers. One hundred and thirteen thousand are authorized this year (1939) for France and 112,774 for overseas forces. These noncommissioned officers and trained privates are the teachers and trainers of the recruits, and of the reservists called for training each year. It has been difficult to secure by voluntary enlistment the full quota despite inducements. Further to utilize to the maximum the annual contingents, a large force of civilian employees is used to perform fatigue and clerical duties normally performed by soldiers.

b. System of Mobilization of Manpower. The mobilization of the Army is carried on by the territorial sections of the General Staff in each of the military regions. These are the directing heads for the mobilization. Their missions are, first, to bring the six reinforced divisions to full strength; second, to bring certain of the 12 normal, 2 Alpine and the cavalry and mechanized divisions to strength, at the same time extracting from these divisions sufficient cadres to form the skeleton for the organization of 20 more divisions; third, to organize such other units as may be necessary; fourth, to maintain replacements.

The territorial staff is, in addition, charged with the mobilization of horses, vehicles, trucks and supplies.

The manpower is mobilized through mobilization centers and recruiting bureaus. The recruiting bureaus may be compared to our draft boards and the mobilization centers to our training camps. Two hundred fourteen mobilization centers have been organized in territorial France.

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Each mobilization center is charged with the constitution of one or more units of a certain arm. The recruiting bureaus send the personnel to the mobilization center which also receives the necessary cadres from the active divisions. The necessary materiel, animals, and equipment it receives from its own depots or from the resources allocated to it in the region or subdivision of the region. The mobilization center then assigns men, animals and equipment to the cadres and the commanding officer of the cadres forms the combat unit. In this way, mobilization duties are entirely taken away from the combat units.

The individual is called by means of posters or mobilization orders, or both. Mobilization orders are all prepared at the recruiting bureaus and indicate exactly what the reservist is required to do. This order is in itself his railroad ticket to his mobilization center. Any change in the residence or in the civil status of the reservist is noted on this mobilization order. All departments of the Government are organized to cooperate in this system.

The necessary depots of arms and equipment are now maintained under the direction of the mobilization centers and are entirely kept up by a body of 11,000 employees, mostly civilian, on constant duty with the mobilization centers.

c. Method of Expansion of Existing Units. The reinforced divisions will first be brought to war strength by use of the two "disponible" classes. Certain of the remaining 14 divisions will be brought to war strength with the rest of the "disponible" and the cadres for the 20 reserve divisions will be taken from the active army. The necessary number of classes from the 1st Reserve will then be called, beginning with the youngest, to fill the 20 reserve divisions and the 14 active divisions. The guiding principle is that before engaging in any major operations, the commander in chief must have 40 infantry divisions and 20 corps staffs, exclusive of the expeditionary force. *2nd*  
*ste could provide line of communication*

d. Probable Rate of Development of Manpower. The population of France proper is 42,000,000 (including 2½ million foreigners). About 81 per cent of the total number of men born reach the age of 20 years fit for military service. In other words, 81 per cent of the annual male birth forms the class called to the colors 20 years later. There is a 5.1 per cent loss between examination and incorporation and a 4.2 per cent loss at incorporation. However, this gives an average for the classes entering the Active Army, the 1st Reserve and the 2d Reserve, of about 250,000 per class (except during the "lean" years).

The French Government estimated in 1935 that the population of North Africa and Colonies would amount to 60,000,000 and that 2,317,000 men would be available for mobilization. Also that 804,000 laborers could be drawn from these colonies. The figure for combatants is believed to be high. The manpower exists but it is highly problematical that it can be used in such numbers. Political unrest, the difficulties of finding officers and noncommissioned officers that understand the natives and speak their language as well as the disinclination of the native to serve in Europe will cut this figure more than in half. Labor to the extent estimated can and will undoubtedly be used.

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The total reserves available in these possessions have been calculated as follows:

Algeria - Tunisia	420,000	Trained and organized
Morocco	225,000	Not organized
Equatorial and West Africa	400,000	Not organized
Total	1,045,000	

Of this number 450,000 are at once available and 595,000 more would be available in M plus 6 months, on the North African coast and in France.

France's minimum requirements for a general mobilization and one that will permit her to assume the offensive are:

Frontier garrisons	110,000
3 Mechanized Divisions	33,000
2 Cavalry Divisions	22,000
20 Active Infantry Divisions	340,000
20 Reserve Infantry Divisions	340,000
20 Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops	220,000
7 Army Headquarters	70,000
Army Troops (Tanks, Engineers, etc.)	100,000
Air Corps (1,500 planes)	50,000
Coast Defense	50,000
Navy	88,000
	<u>1,423,000</u>

To the above figure 500,000 men must be added for the Supply Services which brings the total to 1,923,000 men. The figure for the Supply Services may be considered as conservative, in view of the tremendous increase in automatic weapons and mechanized vehicles now in the hands of the troops.

Consideration must also be given to replacements necessary to maintain the Army at its initial strength. A permanent loss of 35,000 per month or 420,000 per year can be taken as a reasonable estimate of casualties. Initial requirements therefore are:

Troops of the Line	1,423,000
Service of Supply	500,000
Replacements	420,000
	<u>2,343,000</u>

By subtracting this figure from the 4,000,000 men available (see page four, par. b) we find that France has a surplus of 1,657,000 men over and above her initial mobilization requirements. These men may be either used to mobilize additional units or as a reservoir of replacements. It is doubtful that many additional units will be mobilized when one considers that the classes for 1938-1940 inclusive will average but 125,000 men per class. This does not take into consideration the native manpower available in the colonies. It does, however, include the native troops stationed in France. It is assumed that these native troops will be maintained at war strength.

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However, France is not prepared to equip and supply all of her trained reserves at one time and it is doubtful if the total under arms at any time would exceed 3,500,000. With respect to artillery, however, there is known to be in reserve sufficient heavy and railway artillery to meet the requirements of a minimum of 20 Corps and 7 Field Armies.

An estimated progression of mobilization is about as follows:

On M day, 6 reinforced divisions on the frontier and the garrisons of the fortified regions.

7 North African and colonial divisions and 2 brigades in North Africa.

8 Normal and 6 reduced strength divisions in France.

3 Cavalry and 2 light mechanized divisions in France.

The Expeditionary Force stationed in France.

Non-divisional elements.

The total for these forces equals roughly 600,000 men.

On M plus 3 days, addition of the two classes of "disponibles" to fill the reinforced divisions to war strength and to fill up certain of the normal divisions. Total men available for this purpose: 250,000. Total under arms, M plus 3 days: 850,000 men in France and North Africa.

After the first week of mobilization, it is estimated that a reserve of 40,000 would be called up in North Africa. In addition, the first classes to be sent to the normal divisions could then be handled by the mobilization centers which would have received their cadres from the active units and the total for France and North Africa would probably be in the vicinity of 1,300,000.

Taking into consideration the length of time required to organize the reserve divisions so that skeleton units could also, in turn, be filled to war strength, all 20 of these divisions would probably be completed in personnel two weeks after mobilization at which time the total manpower under arms would be about 2,000,000. This number would be regularly increased from then on until the total of 3,500,000 is reached at a date not later than from M plus 6 to M plus 12 months.

e. War Reserve. Reserves for complete mobilization include enough equipment and supplies to organize and maintain an army of 40 divisions exclusive of the overseas and expeditionary force. If the lines of communication with Northern Africa and across the Atlantic can be kept open, the men under arms can be raised to 3,000,000 within four months after mobilization without fear of shortage in any essential supply. The development of production would take longer and the peak of production would not be reached until one year after mobilization. Most of the vehicles and animals required on mobilization are requisitioned from the lists kept at the recruiting bureaus. It is supposed that the war reserve of uniforms, equipment, arms and ammunition which is kept on hand is sufficient for a total force of 2,500,000 men.

f. Method and Rate of Procurement of Supplies. The normal procedure is by contract. In certain cases "direct purchase" and purchases by agents paid on commission are utilized. In time of war the use of requisition is authorized. It is probable that it will be one year after the outbreak of war

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before full production is developed, and that plans are such that development will be fairly uniform.

g. System of Mobilization of Industry. The War Plans Commission of the Supreme Council of National Defense is an organ intended to prepare the industrial, intellectual and moral mobilization of France, and it has been at work since soon after the War. It is composed of a permanent staff and representatives of all departments of the government. It has prepared decrees which would be issued by the Executive on the declaration of war. Many of its provisions are already being applied. These decrees provide for the utilization of all the resources of the country in the event of war, or the threat of aggression, including both personnel and material. The Government is given wide powers of requisitioning as to personal service, inventions, material, manufactures, and property on all of which a census is taken in peacetime. The powers of Parliament to supervise and control acts of the Government in time of war are specified. Individuals or companies are to be allowed only a reasonable profit in time of war.

In each ministry there is an organization to take charge of all matters concerning national defense in that department, and especially to make mobilization plans and keep them up to date.

The present law provides for the taking over by the Government of factories producing war materiel (including aviation) and for the control of private enterprises engaged in the manufacture or sale of war materiel which have not been taken over by the State. Up to now many factories manufacturing war materiel, including aviation, have been nationalized.

#### 7. Theory of Combat.

a. Conception of the Conduct of the War. The French Army is maintained to insure the political objective of the nation which has repeatedly been proclaimed as the preservation of France's security. She denies all territorial ambitions. The Army is organized to cope defensively with the technique of modern attack. It is estimated that it will come as a surprise and be composed of a series of waves initiated by an air attack of great violence employing incendiary bombs and gases. The air attack, devastating in character, will be followed immediately by a powerful ground attack that will be launched by troops well equipped with the latest motor and mechanized means. The above theory assumes that the enemy will seek rapid results by violent methods.

To meet such an attack with her relatively few effectives, France has built up her air army and erected fortifications so as to form a retaliatory force to the air attacks, and also a land barrier of great strength to stem the ground forces which will try to penetrate the frontier zone and disorganize the mobilization taking place behind the fortresses and the covering troops. The first period will therefore be defensive, and no offensive operations will be undertaken except local operations to protect industrial or tactically important regions. Once the nation is organized, and strong enough to assume it, the army will be launched against the adversary in an offensive for a decision.

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51b. Role of Different Arms and Weapons in Battle. (See also Annex No. 1)

(1) Infantry. Infantry is considered the basic arm to the support of which all others are subordinated. It alone can conquer the ground and hold it. The combat group, built up around the automatic rifle, is the elementary unit. In the attack, as well as in the defense, fire action is of the greatest importance. To maneuver is to displace one's fire; to attack is to advance it. Fire and movement are interdependent but the role of fire is predominant. Thus, the attack is based on a plan of fire in which machine guns, mortars, and anti-tank guns constitute a base of fire which covers that portion or "compartment" of the terrain in which the combat groups are advancing. The plan of fire includes the maneuver and forward movement of the fire from this base.

(2) Artillery. Artillery is above all the arm of fire. Fire is its only means of action. It has no independent role but its essential mission in combat is to support the infantry; it prepares the attacks of the latter; it protects it and accompanies it; it aids the infantry in repelling the attacks of the enemy. As a doctrine the French believe that only with strong artillery reinforcement should an attack be launched against an organized position. Accompanying artillery is used only when that stage of the combat is reached when the infantry cannot be supported in any other way.

(3) Aviation cooperates with the other arms. Larger units of the ground forces possess attached or organic means called "cooperative aviation". Offensive action against enemy air and ground troops, and enemy supply and transportation elements, both in the zone of the armies and that of the interior, is stressed. However, the air authorities teach that the demands made upon it by the other arms must take into account its actual possibilities and limitations, its vulnerability, and its expensiveness.

(4) Antiaircraft Defense is considered a complement of the Air Army. In war it will be assigned partly to tactical units and partly to general defense of the territory.

(5) Chemical Warfare Service. It is expected that gas will be used principally in three ways: in clouds from cylinders; in shell fired from projectors; and in artillery shell or air bomb, the latter methods being considered by far the most efficient.

(6) Cavalry. The French hold that the horse is satisfactory for moving rapidly across all sorts of terrain. The missions of the cavalry of reconnaissance, distant and near, patrolling, screening, and combat have not changed but the methods of execution have modified the tactics employed, on account of the development of motors and mechanized units. The theory of cavalry as the agent of security is still dominant but the theory is being modernized to conform to new conceptions of space and time and to the composition of the mechanized units making up the reconnaissance and security detachments. Information must be searched to greater distances, and the distance between the security elements and the main body must be increased. Reconnaissance detachments must be designed for greater mobility and greater penetrating power. The security detachments, especially advance guards, must be more powerful, with strong available artillery and anti-tank support. Armored cars will form a large part of the security detachments, as well as the reconnaissance detachments, and the cavalry must have powerful armored cars, to attack

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and seize the ground, defensive power to hold it and weapons to counter the attack of hostile mechanized units.

c. Method of Conducting Combat.

(1) Defensive. A defensive position from the viewpoint of terrain includes a selected line of observation posts for artillery and a field of fire for infantry weapons. Once this position is selected, the ground in front of the observation posts and where possible at least 1,500 meters in front, is covered by a band of organized fires of all weapons. Every part of the ground is beaten by the weapon most suited to the task, with machine gun fire of the first importance. The main line of resistance is the resulting position for rifles, automatic rifles, and machine guns in order to secure the above effect. The position is organized by the infantry in depth. Artillery is placed primarily so as to cover the main line of resistance, reinforcing and completing the infantry fire. Of secondary importance are the artillery fires within the position and on the lines of approach. Recently, much attention has been given to the choice and preparation of defensive positions with regard to their capabilities for defense against tank and mechanized attacks. Natural obstacles and unfavorable terrain for tank movements are considered factors of great importance. Zones of approach favorable to tank attack must be barred by artificial obstacles or tank mines and covered by the fire of anti-tank guns. The latter are also distributed in depth throughout the position to protect artillery and other rear establishments from the penetrating or flank action of tanks.

Outposts usually have a combat mission. For this they are organized into strong points well ahead of the main line of resistance. Where possible the outposts are placed so that the attack of the outpost position and the main line of resistance cannot be made by the same artillery without displacement. This does not mean that the defense will conduct two battles, one on the outpost line and one on the main line of resistance.

(2) Offensive. The infantry does not attack organized positions without artillery support. 75mm. battalions support infantry battalions by their fire and the remaining 75mm. and medium battalions remain in general support. To insure constant liaison between the artillery and the infantry battalions, certain lines are usually selected ahead of time where the attack may stop while this liaison is being reestablished. These are the intermediate objectives and the attack is generally by bounds. The length of bounds is controlled by necessities of terrain and by the desire to avoid exposing a partial and uncoordinated attack to the concentrated fire from a whole position. Schematism and the set form are avoided.

The main function of tanks is to assist the infantry in the attack of organized positions.

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REPORT ON

FRENCH TACTICAL DOCTRINE, ORGANIZATION, AND MATERIEL

based on observations made while at the

Ecole Superieure de Guerre  
(1935-1937)

by

Lt. Colonel Ralph C. Smith, Infantry

August 10, 1937.

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I. Scope of this report.

This report covers observations made during the period 1935-1937 on:

Tactical Doctrine	Organization
General Staff Methods	Materiel
General Conclusions	

This report is in no sense a complete treatise on these items. It represents only those points that have impressed me as being especially noteworthy, either because confirming or differing somewhat from American ideas, or particularly as indicating new trends of thought.

II. Tactical Doctrine.

A. Defense.

1. Defense of stream lines. The outstanding feature of the current French doctrine on defense is the great importance attached to using stream lines and similar obstacles to protect against surprise attacks by mechanized weapons. Previous to the threat of tank attacks, the principal emphasis in choice of defensive positions was given to ground observation and to field of fire. The trend now is to subordinate these items if necessary, in order to get behind a stream line that will stop or greatly impede armored vehicles. As an example, a corps withdrawal was studied in the second-year course. The terrain was of special interest to an American student because it was the Meuse-Argonne area. In this problem the Red (French) Corps, to avoid an enemy threat on its left flank, withdrew as part of a general retrograde movement, pivoting on its right, in the region northwest of Verdun. The corps axis of withdrawal was Dun - Montfaucon - Avocourt - Recicourt - Fleury.

In choosing delaying positions between the Meuse in the region of Dun, and the Buanthe in the region of Varennes-Avocourt, an intermediate position was designated on the heights of Montfaucon. During the discussion of the problem it was brought out that this position would have been considered the strongest of all in pre-tank days. It had fine observation and a good field of fire. However, unless a delay of several days could be reasonably assured to prepare the position against a mechanized attack, it was better to count on it only as very temporary delaying position and to fall back behind the stream-line of the Buanthe for the next position of resistance. Attention was called to the possibilities of using persistent gas in the dense woods of Bois de Cheppy and Malancourt, provided that gas was being employed. (All the French references to use of chemicals are as guarded as in our own problems; they preface every mention by reference to treaty restrictions.)

They emphasize that the attacker has the lead in the choice of time of attack, and its direction. The defender must make the most of his weapon, the terrain. Whenever one is available, the most effective defense can be made behind a stream line. The following statements sum up their doctrine of the defense of stream lines:

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a. Defense of stream lines is based on an effective combination of fire and obstacle.

b. As long as the defense has artillery in position to cover possible crossings, with fire directed by good ground or air observation, an unfordable stream offers an obstacle that is almost complete for artillery and tanks.

c. To defend the obstacle against a surprise attack, it is necessary to use only enough infantry to establish a continuous line of fire by automatic weapons and to cover possible tank crossings with anti-tank guns. Unless the attacker has amphibious tanks, in numbers and of a quality not yet believed to be attained by any army, he cannot force a crossing over the obstacle except by a large-scale attack with very heavy artillery support.

d. In case of such a large-scale attack, an alert intelligence service of the defense will have ample warning by the attacker's concentration of artillery materiel and munitions. The real defensive battle will then take place on a well-chosen position, several thousand yards in rear of the stream line. This position will be carefully camouflaged and every effort will be made not to disclose it to the enemy until during the attack, when he is near the limit of his first effort, his artillery firing at extreme ranges and the great bulk of his tanks on his own side of the river.

e. The defense will thus fight its battle on ground of its own choosing and will have an excellent chance to gain a defensive victory, a victory however that must necessarily be negative as far as the strategic situation is concerned.

2. Depth of defensive positions. There has been a definite trend toward greater depth for defensive positions. The regimental reserve line (ligne d'arret) marks the rear of the main position of resistance as in American doctrine. Heretofore it has generally been sited 1000-2000 yards from the main line of resistance, in order to cover with small-arms fire the forward portions of the position. The tendency is to pull this line back whenever the terrain permits. Sometimes it has been as far as 3000-3500 yards from the main line. They take advantage of reverse slopes as much as possible for the rear portions of the position in order to reduce the effects of hostile artillery fire. Automatic weapons and anti-tank guns are distributed in depth throughout the position so as to cover the entire area with fire, as nearly as that is practicable. In a typical infantry defense problem, the eight pairs of guns of each battalion machine gun company were placed with an average of but three pairs within a few hundred yards of the main line. The other pairs of guns were distributed in depth through the battalion position. Their idea is to have only enough infantry in the front line to establish a continuous barrage of automatic fire to stop infantry, and a continuous barrage of anti-tank guns to stop mechanized weapons.

It is recognized that positions must not be made so deep that the defense will not be able to deliver an effective battle. A division can exert its maximum effort on but one position at a time. If the effort is spread out

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too thin there is risk of defeat in detail. The rear of the main position is almost always in front of the forward positions of the light artillery.

They have introduced in recent problems a new terminology of "rear barrage line". This is a line established by the alert positions of division reserves in rear of the regimental reserve line. The anti-tank guns of the reserves and part of the divisional 75mm. anti-tank battery are established along this line or zone to furnish an additional guarantee to the artillery against tanks that may succeed in penetrating the main position.

3. Anti-tank defense. The French have given great attention to anti-tank defense. Its importance is stressed in every problem. There has been a growing confidence in its effectiveness, especially in the light of reports from the Spanish combats. I have mentioned the tendency to get behind stream lines. If none is available, every effort is made to improve any obstacle offered by railroad embankments or cuts, canals, highway grades, woods, stone-walls, villages, etc. The possibilities of this sort of work enter into every evaluation or reconnaissance of a position.

The use of anti-tank mines has become standard procedure. Mines now represent for tanks as much of an obstacle as did barbed wire for infantry in 1914. The placing of mines is considered of equal urgency with erecting barbed wire obstacles. In practically every defense problem, sufficient mines to cover a front of 2000 to 3000 yards for each division in line are brought up the first night that work is to be done on a new position. They study carefully the road net for possibilities of delivering the mines close to the position. They often use ammunition carts and mechanized ammunition vehicles (chenillettes) to get the mines from the point of delivery by truck to the point of installation. They calculate the amount of manpower necessary to carry them and to put them in place; they say 25 men can lay a barrage of 1000 yards in one night. The mines carry a charge of 6 to 8 pounds of explosive, enough to blow off the track of a tank; when the tank is immobilized, its destruction by gun fire is not difficult.

Since I have been over here, the 25mm. anti-tank gun has been issued to all infantry regiments. They have 9 per regiment, with 4 more in the divisional cavalry; a total of 31 in each division. They still have the old 37mm. gun but do not consider it's effective against modern tanks except at very close ranges. In addition to these guns, the division has a special battery of six standard 75mm. guns, each with a portable platform that permits rapid traverse. These guns are used as separate pieces and incorporated into the anti-tank defense system. The French are not satisfied with this proportion of anti-tank guns; they are experimenting with a divisional company that will probably have about 25 to 30 guns. They believe that the absolute minimum of anti-tank guns to establish a barrage is 3 guns per 1000 yards. Where the terrain is quite favorable to tanks, the ratio should reach nearer 8 or 10 guns per 1000 yards.

The locations of the successive lines of anti-tank guns and the areas to be barred by mines are important parts of the division commander's decision in the organization of any defensive position.

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4. Tanks in defense. Tanks are used in defense, especially the medium tanks (chars D), whenever any are available for this purpose. They are kept fairly well forward in the defense zone and may act either on their own to deliver a sharp, unexpected blow to an enemy that has penetrated the first position, or they may support a counterattack by an infantry unit. They also serve to check hostile tanks if these have broken through the barrages of mines and anti-tank weapons. It is emphasized that careful reconnaissance is more than ever necessary so that friendly tanks will not be disabled by the defender's own mine fields.

5. Use of demolitions. The French attach great importance to the use of demolitions. They expect to use them whenever possible: in delaying action, in front of defensive positions, and to cover flanks or gaps in large fronts. After reconnaissances and from consideration of the means available in explosives and labor, they make careful estimates of possibilities for destructions. As a rough basis of calculations, they say that it takes for each unit area 1000 meters by 1000 meters, 1/2 ton of explosives and 50 man-days of labor. An army zone of destructions 40 km. deep on a 50 km. front required 1000 tons and 100,000 man-days to prepare. It was accomplished in about five nights. All bridges on Northern France have provision for placing explosives for their destruction.

They point out that cross-country vehicles can be greatly impeded by a good system of destructions. Even though tanks and tracked vehicles may be able to cross a zone of destructions, they will be greatly delayed. And both tanks and artillery are dependent on roads to bring up their supplies and the great quantities of ammunition that are demanded by large-scale attacks.

#### E. Attack.

1. Attack by mechanized weapons. There has been a definite evolution in the doctrine on the use of tanks in attack. For a certain period after the war, it was hoped to use tanks in initial phases of attacks to break through positions; it was hoped that their employment would replace or greatly reduce the amount of artillery that was necessary. The developments of mines and anti-tank guns have definitely checked the doctrine of tank supremacy. If a defender has had more than two or three nights to organize a position, it is considered that he can create a defense that will definitely stop a surprise tank attack. If he is behind a stream line, it is all the greater advantage for the defense.

The attacker must find a means to cross the tank obstacles before he can hope to make use of the speed and armor of his mechanized weapons. The French have made some experiments in the spring of 1937 on using artillery to destroy mine fields. They have not yet published their findings but I understand that they are convinced that it will take considerably more ammunition to create passages in a mine field for tanks than to breach an obstacle of barbed wire for infantry. In addition to the difficulty of locating the mines, either by ground or air observation or by photographs, it is harder to regulate the fire on the mine fields once they have been found. There is less advantage of explosive effect on mines than on wire. After the gaps have been made, it

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is essential that the tanks know exactly where they are. And this destruction must immediately precede the attack to prevent the defender from replacing the mines or from covering the gaps with anti-tank guns. Finally, the artillery must be of small enough caliber so that the shell holes will not create a serious obstacle in themselves.

They are studying the possibilities of mine destroyers, either a roller or some such apparatus that could be pushed ahead of heavy tanks, or perhaps some special armored vehicle. I have not been able to learn of any real progress in this line, but I know it is receiving attention. Until something better is found, they continue to count on artillery fire.

If the enemy has had several days to prepare his position thoroughly, tanks cannot hope to penetrate the first position without a very heavy artillery preparation. In a recent field exercise, they did not use tanks at all in the first phase of an attack against such a position, but reserved them for use in the exploitation after the main position had been penetrated.

However, if the enemy has not had time to prepare his position, or if it is assumed that the mine defense has been breached, then the mechanized forces come into full play. Large masses of tanks can be used to economize infantry. In the present state of development, they use three types of tanks for three different purposes:

a. Accompanying tanks (Chars F-T or leger-moderne), light tanks under 10 tons that act in close support of the infantry echelon to overcome automatic weapons that may have escaped the artillery preparation; they will operate in a zone but a few hundred yards ahead of the leading infantry wave and must always be closely followed by the infantry.

b. Maneuver tanks (Chars D), medium tanks of 12-14 tons that precede the lighter accompanying tanks up to distances of 1500-2000 yards and smother enemy fire that may impede the advance of the assault echelon. These tanks must be protected by artillery barrages but are able to close up on artillery fires because of their armor.

c. Heavy tanks (Chars B), newest models weighing around 30 tons, operate in the waves of maneuver tanks. By their greater fire power, they engage undestroyed anti-tank guns and stop enemy tanks that may counterattack. Their role is primarily to protect the other tanks.

The tank density for a large-scale attack will run from 60 to 80 tanks of all types per 1000 yards.

2. Mechanism of attacks. The French doctrine of careful, methodical attacks continues in force. In meeting engagements, they push air and ground reconnaissance aggressively, utilize armored cars and rotors to speed up preparations for an attack. But once the enemy has been definitely located as having established a continuous line of automatic fire, supported by artillery, they believe it is taking the desire for the reality to sacrifice method for uncoordinated action. They wish to lose no time in preparing the attack. The

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commander must make prompt decisions and his staff must coordinate the movements of troops and supplies in rapidly changing situations. But they do not intend to repeat the experiences of 1914 where the divisions became so often fully engaged in local fights before the higher commanders could influence the action. They want the battle to begin where and when the commander wishes; they do not wish to risk an attack against an enemy in position until the attacker has the support of his own artillery with the necessary liaisons established. They will often make local attacks in favorable terrain compartments to verify the contact and be sure that the enemy screen is solidly established. If this phase of "engagement" shows the enemy to be in position, they proceed to organize their attack as rapidly as possible.

Since an infantry battalion can attack on a front of 600 to 700 meters the limiting factor is artillery support. Hence they base their calculations on the possibilities of their artillery. A division with only its organic artillery of three 75mm. battalions cannot furnish support for an attack on a wider front than about 1000 meters (300 meters front per artillery battalion for support by successive concentrations). This is a front that could be more than covered by two infantry battalions. So if the attack is on a large scale they always bring in re-enforcing artillery, usually porte or tractor drawn. The movements by road of this artillery and the movement to battery positions of the necessary ammunition are calculated in detail by the staff. The length of the preparation and the time of launching the attack depend on the possibilities shown by these calculations.

The attack is organized after a careful study of the terrain. Definite directions of effort are always assigned subordinate units as part of their missions. These directions do not mean that the mass of the unit must be maintained continuously along a certain axis. They show the zone that the commander considers most important in his maneuver and where he wishes his subordinate to have the greatest force at the end of a phase. Maneuver and flanking action are necessary to advance an attack. In order to coordinate the action of subordinate units, objectives based on terrain compartments are assigned.

Division objectives are usually from one horizon line to the next, when these distances do not exceed 2000-3000 yards. Their purpose is to coordinate the action of the artillery with the infantry to advance observation posts, to permit the infantry to close up on barrages. The halts on these objectives are as short as possible, seldom more than thirty minutes.

Corps objectives are more distant and correspond to definite phases of the maneuver. They usually provide for advancing at least part of the light artillery. They may mark a zone where the character of the terrain changes for the divisions or they may mark the rupture of the enemy position and the passage to the exploitation phase. They permit the corps commander to regain control of his maneuver, modify zones or directions or perhaps introduce new units.

3. Secondary attacks. In regard to so-called holding or secondary attacks, the French teach that small units know but one method of attack -

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that is to attack. Larger units such as divisions may graduate the weight of the effort by assigning wider fronts, less reserves, less artillery support, etc. But no attack should be ordered unless the attacking infantry has the means to support its advance. Each infantry unit must make its attack as if it were the key to the whole maneuver. In fact, no commander can be sure that efforts he has planned as secondary may not be the only ones to succeed and may cause a modification of the maneuver during the operation; many historical instances show that this happens.

When adequate support by artillery or tanks cannot be allotted to certain parts of a zone, these fronts are neutralized by fire only, until the advance of neighboring units permits troops to advance, or until fire support becomes available to apply to them.

C. Security.

The French intend to avoid meeting engagements as much as possible. They expect aviation and distant ground reconnaissance to give adequate warning of contact. For ground forces they have three echelons of security:

1. Distant security (surete eloignee). To permit the commander of the large units to select his battle zone and make his dispositions, a certain zone is necessary. The depth of this zone depends on the speed of the friendly and enemy forces. For non-motorized forces it may be 15 to 20 km.; for motorized units it may be as much as 40 to 50 km. This commander's security is assured by sending ahead detachments to establish a screen. If possible, a stream line will be selected so that adequate protection may be had by covering the crossings. This security will be furnished by cavalry units, by the corps and divisions reconnaissance groups, by motorized and mechanized forces. It usually coordinated by corps or army. An important decision on contact is whether to reinforce this distant security or to take a position in rear and have the detachments fight delaying actions.

2. Close security (surete rapprochee). To give the main bodies time and space to prepare for combat, close security is furnished by advance, flank and rear guards. In ordinary advance guards, they tend to keep the artillery at the head of the main bodies, sending reconnaissance parties only with the advance guard. This is especially the case if the artillery is motorized so that it can advance rapidly.

Security detachments are always supplied with anti-tank weapons; they often use detachments of tanks with the advance guard to speed up reconnaissance and to combat hostile mechanized attacks. They plan in advance for road blocks to delay enemy mechanized detachments that may get through the distant security or around the flanks.

3. Immediate security (surete immediate). The troops themselves are covered on the march and in bivouac by their own observers and weapons, against air and mechanized attacks and against gas.

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III. General Staff Technique.

1. Form of decisions. The French make a clear distinction between command decisions and general staff elaboration of details. They teach that the commander decides in clear and unmistakable terms on all the points that involve his responsibility. The general staff makes the calculations that give the commander the data on which to base his decision; it works out the detailed orders for execution. But there is clear emphasis that the commander alone is responsible and that his decisions are not made for him by any staff officer.

The decision as taught at the Ecole de Guerre has three parts:

a. The conception by the commander, that is his scheme of maneuver. It states that the attitude to be adopted, gives an exact definition of the object to be attained, and the actions necessary to attain this object. It indicates the relative importance of the different actions or elements.

b. The organization of his forces to carry out this conception by means of:

- organization of command with creation of tactical groupings if necessary;
- assignment of terrain to units or groupings
  - in width in zones of action,
  - in depth by indicating echelons if necessary;
- allotment of reenforcing units or fire at the commander's disposition;
- units or means held in reserve;
- missions assigned subordinate units.

c. Essential information required for subsequent decisions, with hour by which it must be available, regarding:

- the enemy,
- the situation of friendly units,
- the terrain.

The decision is usually shown on a map or tracing, accompanied by whatever brief notes are necessary to make it clear to the staff officer who is to put in the form of orders.

2. Orders. The French confirm all orders in writing. They use the telephone to speed things up, but they mistrust it. I honestly believe French is a harder language to transmit by telephone than English. It may be

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that their materiel is not up to our standards, but whatever the reason, they have more trouble in understanding each other over the telephone than do our own people.

Their formal field orders follow the same general form as our own. They do not class them in five paragraphs, but they cover the same points in about the same sequence.

The most important part is the paragraph they call "The Commander's Intention." It reproduces in the commander's words his scheme of maneuver as given in his decision. This statement serves as a guide to the subordinates in showing the relation of their missions to the action of the whole. If some unforeseen event arises, it permits the subordinate to act in accordance with his superior's general plan. The same idea is contained in paragraph two of our field orders, but they usually elaborate it more than we do.

3. "Unit of Fire" in Ammunition Supply. For calculating artillery ammunition requirements, the French use the term "unit of fire" rather than the World War term "day of fire"; they find this terminology less confusing. A unit includes approximately the ammunition for two hours' fire at average rates used in combat. The common units are:

75mm.	200 rounds
105mm.	100
155 How.	75
155 GPF	100

In calculating transport requirements of large amounts of ammunition they use "battalion unit of fire" which is the unit per piece multiplied by 12. They have average figures on the tonnages of these units which permit rapid calculation of the number of trucks needed, the road space required, etc. Detailed figures on all ammunition calculations of this sort including units of fire for infantry weapons, are given on pages 278-300, Aide-Memoire pour les Travaux d'Etat-Major, 1937.

The French give great attention to this matter of ammunition supply. Division and larger unit commanders usually indicate in their decisions in terms of units of fire, the ammunition consumption authorized for each phase of an operation. The artillery does not exceed this allowance without specific authority. The commander thus retains control of his ammunition and is assured that it will not be used up on some less important phase of the operation and leave a shortage at the moment of his principal effort.

One of the first concerns of the staff is to estimate the possibilities of the road net and transportation available to move in the ammunition required for the operation. The whole rhythm of the attack and the moment when it may be launched often depend on the amount of ammunition available.

#### IV. Organization.

1. Infantry divisions. The general scheme of organization of French divisions is based on three infantry regiments and a divisional artillery of

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one three-battalion regiment of 75mm. guns and one two-battalion regiment of 155mm. howitzers. The detailed organization has been the subject of some modification, especially under the influence of motorization. During 1935, nearly every problem had a different sort of organization. Now they have settled to three types of infantry divisions with varying degrees of motorization:

The normal or non-motorized division.  
The Type 2 or partially-motorized division.  
The Type 1 or fully motorized division.

The normal and Type 2 divisions are much the same. The principal difference is in the greater degree of motorization of the trains of the latter. The artillery in both is horse-drawn.

In the Type 1 divisions, the only animals retained are in the infantry regiments. The carts for machine guns, 60mm. mortars, 37mm. guns and the rolling kitchens are still animal drawn. Everything else, including the Divisional Reconnaissance Group is motorized. The artillery is tractor-drawn. In case of movements by bus, they usually provide truck transportation for the animals and rolling kitchens as well as the foot troops.

They are gradually converting most of their non-motorized divisions to Type 2; on mobilization, they intend to have the bulk of their units of this type. They will have a certain number of Type 1 divisions in the strategic reserve.

The Type 2 division consists of about 500 officers and 17,500 men; the Type 1 of 520 officers and 16,000 men. The detailed organization is given in the 1937 edition of "Aide-Memoire pour les Travaux d'Etat-Major." (In G-2)

2. Infantry units within the division. The French brigade echelon is represented by a brigadier general with a small headquarters of 3 officers and 21 men. It is not necessarily a link in the chain of command; in most situations orders are issued direct to regiments by the division commander. The brigadier is usually the second ranking officer of the division and is used by the division commander as a pinch hitter. If there is a special situation requiring coordination he will use the brigadier for this purpose. In an approach march the distant security on the division front may be coordinated by the infantry brigadier; in a withdrawal or in the organization of a rear position he is often used where a senior officer is needed, especially if detachments of other arms or more than one regiment are involved. In a straight attack he may be assigned no function during the initial stages of the action, but may be held in "command reserve" and used to organize an exploitation detachment.

In the organization within the regiment, the French do not favor centralizing accompanying weapons above the battalion. I discussed this point with a number of instructors and the consensus of opinion was that the speed of response to requests for fire will be slower if they must be coordinated at

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the regimental echelon rather than at the battalion. They say that in the offensive the beginning of the attack is usually well coordinated. The enemy's visible targets are all engaged by the attacker's artillery, the defender's observation is blinded and his artillery is neutralized. When the attack begins to approach the limit of its artillery support, when some guns have to start displacing forward, when observation becomes increasingly difficult, at this phase of the attack the need of its own supporting weapons becomes most acute for the infantry. The man on the spot who is most likely to know the source of the fire that is holding up his advance is the infantry platoon and company commander. If the call for supporting fire has to go beyond the battalion, they fear the response will be too slow. They recognize the advantage of relieving the battalion commander of as much heavy and slower moving materiel as possible. But they believe that in the final analysis the battalion commander will have to control whatever fire of close support he is to have other than that of supporting artillery; they contend it is better to have these weapons organically part of the infantry battalion.

Actually, the trend is toward greater decentralization. They have recently adopted a 60mm. mortar that I shall mention in a later paragraph. This weapon is not to replace the 81mm. mortar, but to supplement it. The larger mortar is primarily in the battalion echelon; the smaller mortar is a company weapon designed to fill the gap in high-angle fire between grenades and the 81mm. mortar.

3. Separate machine-gun battalions. The French use separate machine-gun battalions from general reserves in most of their problems. This reserve of fire-power gives a considerable degree of flexibility to their defense and permits them to concentrate more mobile units for offensive action at critical points. These units and their tactical use have been covered in detail in M. A. Paris Report No. 23,084-W, January 11, 1937.

4. Cavalry units. Cavalry organization was thoroughly covered in reports of Lieutenant Colonel Rayner last year. The changes this year have tended to increase mobility at the expense of power. The porte dragons of the normal cavalry division have been reduced to one battalion instead of three, and the light mechanized division has been given one regiment of three battalions instead of two regiments of two battalions each. These porte dragons are about the same as motorized infantry; they are mounted in light trucks and fully motorized, including full transport for all personnel and weapons. Each battalion has about the fire-power of an infantry battalion. The battalions gained by reducing the cavalry and light mechanized divisions have been put into General Reserve. They will be used to reinforce large units and increase the flexibility of the reserves at the disposal of General Headquarters.

The French use motorcycles and side-cars to replace animal mounts in a great deal of their motorization. The infantry regimental mounted scout detachments are now all equipped with motorcycles instead of horses. The divisional and corps reconnaissance groups include motorcycles as important parts of their combat elements. The mechanized cavalry units have motorcycles that accompany most of their cars as a holding echelon. In their country of good



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roads they seem to be quite satisfactory. I am not convinced that they are practical for our purposes. I think the French are largely influenced by questions of economy in procurement and in gasoline consumption.

5. Air Infantry (Parachute Troops). The instruction at the Ecole de Guerre included mention of Air Infantry this year. A battalion of two companies was given as being part of an air army. Each company is transported in 12 transport planes and consists of:

- One headquarters platoon.
- Three rifle platoons of three squads each.
- One weapons platoon of two machine-guns and two anti-tank guns.

The tactical employment suggested has been covered in a separate report. I do not think many French officers are seriously impressed with the immediate possibilities of this use of parachute troops, especially in the densely populated areas of Western Europe. They do feel however that it cannot be ignored. The threat of its employment may be important in compelling an enemy to use large forces to guard against such landings.

#### V. Materiel.

##### 1. Anti-tank guns.

a. 25mm. gun. As stated above, the French consider that the wartime 37mm. gun is not effective against modern tanks except at very short ranges because of its low muzzle velocity. They still retain it as part of the battalion Accompanying Weapons Company but I think it will soon be declared obsolete. They have now issued their new 25mm. gun as the anti-tank weapon for infantry and cavalry units. This gun has the following characteristics:

Length of barrel	1.80 meters (probably including flash hider)
Muzzle velocity	1050 meter/seconds
Effective range	1000 meters
Angle of traverse	60 degrees; split trail
Projectile	non-explosive; case-hardened exterior filled with soft metal; claimed to produce maximum penetration and to shatter in interior of target.
Rate of Fire	20 to 30 shots per minute.

Although I did not see the gun fired, I observed it in maneuvers. It seems to be easily handled and pointed and easy to camouflage. It uses direct fire only; pieces are used separately, not in pairs as are machine guns. In motorized regiments, the cannon is drawn by armored ammunition carriers (chenillettes); in the others it is equipped with a mule-drawn cart as for the standard 37mm. gun. The guns are assigned to a regimental Weapons Company, which has three platoons of three guns each. The French seem to be satisfied that the gun is effective against modern tanks up to a range of 1000 meters. One of its important advantages is its maneuverability and the ease with which it can be concealed.

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I saw models of a 37mm. anti-tank gun at the Schneider factory at Havre, but I have not heard that they intend to adopt this weapon.

b. Platform for 75mm. guns. A special battery of six standard 75mm. guns for anti-tank defense has been added to each division. Each gun has a special platform permitting rapid traverse through wide angles. This platform weighs about 400 pounds and is in the form of a metal wheel; its under side has a double series of metal studs about six inches long that fix the platform to the ground. The upper surface has a raised inner rim that fits just inside the wheels of the piece; there are two rods that fit into a spring in the base and which are attached to each leg of the trail. A series of twelve holes in the rim of the base permit a large pin in the trail spade to make the major changes in direction. The platform is carried on a caisson or in a truck; it can be installed in about five minutes. I saw the platform in use against a towed target the size of a tank. The piece was manipulated with considerable facility, but it seems to me that it would be hard to conceal a piece as large as a 75mm. gun, especially since it must use direct fire against tanks.

2. Anti-tank mines. In all defense problems anti-tank mines have been used. The French seem to have a growing confidence in their effectiveness. I have not been able to examine these mines, but they have been described as flat and dish-shaped, exploding on contact; they weigh from 15 to 25 pounds each and carry a charge of 6 to 8 pounds of explosive. They are laid in a double zig-zag row with 18 to 24 inches between the centers of each mine. The mines are planted across the areas most favorable to tank advance. The ends of the fields are usually brought to tank obstacles such as streams or dense woods. They are said to be easily camouflaged. Both infantry and engineers are instructed in their use.

3. Tanks. The three types of tanks in current use have been mentioned in Section II above. Their characteristics have been given in previous reports. French thought seems to trend toward heavier armor at the expense of speed. They feel buttressed in these conclusions by the experiences in Spain. Because of poor vision and other limitations, tanks cannot actually utilize battlefield speeds much in excess of 10 to 12 miles per hour; some reserve of power is necessary, but to sacrifice protection for great speed does not accord with their idea. One serious obstacle to the employment of very heavy tanks, that is those weighing upward from 40 to 50 tons, is the difficulty of crossing them over road bridges in movements prior to attack.

4. Armored self-propelled artillery. Considerable effort has been given to developing a self-propelled armored mount for artillery. The 1936 tables for the Light Mechanized Division called for such weapons under the name of "auto-cannon". The ordnance service has been unable to develop a vehicle that meets the requirements. So the latest tables for the Light Mechanized Division omit these weapons. Their heavy tank (Char B) comes as near this conception as they have been able to approach; but it is truly a tank and not artillery.

5. Armored vehicles for OP's and CP's. There has been frequent mention of the need for armored vehicles for observation and command posts for infantry

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and cavalry commanders who must use mechanized weapons. Medium tanks (Chars D) and distant reconnaissance cars (AMD) have been mentioned as suitable for this purpose. These vehicles are equipped with voice radio and permit communication with superiors and subordinates. Commanders of a regimental or higher echelon can use them for reconnaissance and then move back under covered terrain to give orders.

I understand they are also working on an armored observation post for artillery that will permit this arm to furnish closer support for infantry and tank attacks. The idea seems to have some sort of vehicle that will be self-propelled, easily concealed, and at least splinter proof.

6. Armored ammunition carriers for infantry. The chenillette has been described in previous reports. It is now being issued to all infantry regiments, 18 per motorized regiment, 9 to others. The vehicle is full track and has good cross-country mobility; it has space for two persons in armored compartments. On the rear portion is an open steel box that can carry a half-ton of munitions; the vehicle can draw a trailer with another half-ton load. By means of levers in the control compartment, the trailer can be dropped and the load in the box can be dumped without stopping the chenillette. In place of the trailer, a 25mm. anti-tank gun may be drawn. The vehicle is used for many odd jobs in addition to its function as ammunition carrier; mines, wire, tools, communication material, and food may be delivered across exposed areas.

7. Infantry weapons.

a. Automatic-rifle plates. Each automatic rifleman carries two small steel plates that serve as fixed bases for his weapon. One plate has holes for the feet of the bipod. The other is a curved arc whose radius is the distance between the bipod and the butt rest; it has a series of holes for the base of the adjustable screw post that serves to support the butt. When the gun is laid along its final protective line, these plates are imbedded in the ground and the position marked. The gun may then be moved out of this position, but it can be quickly replaced in the plates and fired along the designated line, even in dark or smoke, with almost as much accuracy as a machine gun.

b. 60-mm. mortar. Each rifle company has now been issued a 60-mm. mortar. The mortar is transported on an animal-drawn cart even in motorized regiments. It is light enough so that it can be carried and easily keep up with riflemen. Like all mortars it is a heavy consumer of ammunition, but they think the chenillette will help to solve this problem. Officers who have had the mortar in their companies tell me that it is accurate up to 1000 yards; they are also enthusiastic about the possibility of having this small reserve of high-angle fire power directly under control of the company commander. The mortar is a small edition of the 81mm. Stokes-Brandt. Its squad consists of 1 NCO and 5 men including the mule-leader. The characteristics of the weapon are as follows:

Total weight of mortar, including bipod and base	
plate, all carried by one man	39 lbs.
Weight of one round	3 lbs.

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Box of six rounds .....	24 lbs.
Total rounds transported on cart .....	96
Total rounds carried by squad when mortar is taken from cart .....	42
Range .....	110 to 1100 yards
Rate of fire .....	20 rounds per minute

8. Radio telephone for infantry battalions. I saw a demonstration of their ER 140, a light portable voice radio that it is said is to be issued at the rate of five sets per infantry battalion. I saw it used up to about 1000 yards; it is claimed to operate up to 4000 or 5000 yards in favorable terrain. It can also be used with balloons and autogyros. The wave length is 5.30 to 6.30 meters, said to be difficult for hostile goniometric stations to pick up. The question of secrecy is immediately suggested. They say that although an enemy may capture some of the messages, they will probably be "cold" before they could be exploited. Furthermore, a simple code can be developed within the battalion that will afford a good deal of secrecy. The set has three lamps. It is divided into two loads, each weighing about 12 pounds. The leading man carries part of the set strapped to his back; this includes an L-shaped antenna of collapsible steel rods about a yard long. The operator follows the leading man and carries the rest of the set. I saw the machine in operation and listened in on a conversation that was perfectly clear, even when the carriers were lying down.

9. Observation balloons and autogyros. All observation balloons are being equipped with motorized baskets for use in displacements. The change over from the observation basket to the motorized basket can be made in about 20 minutes. They send a reel truck and skeleton ground crew ahead to the new emplacement, then fly the balloon up. This method reduces considerably the time out of action.

They have definitely adopted autogyros as part of their observation system. They propose to give a section of three machines to each corps balloon group. Their idea is that the autogyros will operate mostly in a zone between the balloons and the observation airplanes.

10. Protective balloons. The French use captive balloons of the same general type as observation balloons, but of smaller volume, to establish barrages at night in the path of enemy bombers. There are two types: N which reach an altitude of 2000 meters, and NN which, mounted in tandem above the N balloons, can reach up to 3500 meters. The use of such barrages will force the bombers up to altitudes above 3500 meters where visibility and accuracy will be greatly reduced. The balloons are grouped in section of 10 reel trucks, 10 N and 10 NN balloons each. They are mounted at distances of 500 to 800 meters apart, so that one section can bar for 4000 to 7000 meters. It requires about 36 hours to establish a section. They are used at considerable distances from the front, along the routes of approach most likely to be used by hostile bombers attacking cities or critical areas.

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VI. General Summary and Conclusions.

The French military doctrine is essentially conservative. This is in harmony with their national policy as a nation that does not seek territorial expansion but desires to preserve what it has and to maintain the status quo. Without neglecting other possibilities, the situation that is ever uppermost in their minds is an attack on their territory by Germany.

They have rejected the air doctrine of Douhet because they believe that their antiaircraft defense, their pursuit, and the threat of reprisal will not permit the gaining of the decision by air attacks alone. They have likewise abandoned the Fuller idea of independent action by tanks and mechanized forces, at least in the present relative state of development of tanks and anti-tank defense. The reports during the past year of the fighting in Spain have tended to reinforce them in both these concepts.

They have devoted large resources to their line of fortifications along the northeast frontier. They have confidence in its effectiveness and expect it to enable them to mobilize in reasonable security and with a relatively small personnel devoted to covering forces. They expect to use these fortifications as a base of maneuver; they emphasize that such works must be integrated into the general deployment of the armies. If they are attacked around either flank of the fortified line they expect to be able to block an advance with a mobile defense until they are reenforced by their allies.

They do not believe that a new war will be a short one; they fear another struggle of exhaustion. They think the defense has found counter-measures for new methods of attack that have been tried up to date.

Mechanized forces will play an important part in preliminary operations and in exploitation after a successful attack. But to break through an established position, they think the attacker must still rely on the superiority of his artillery to open the way for his infantry.

Since all their operations contemplate the use of large forces, there is less opportunity for independent action by lower unit commanders. However they do not neglect the possibilities of maneuver; these always exist in any zone; furthermore gaps are always likely to occur in any formation on a broad front.

After two years close contact with their methods, I feel that they have a good army, trained by a system that is adapted to their needs. Their doctrine is not suitable in its entirety for American purposes. But I think we can profitably consider their respect for the defensive power of an enemy in position.

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